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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This action is before this court upon Petition for Writ of
Certiorari from an order and judgment of the Utah Court of
Appeals entered on February 2, 1990.

The Petition for Writ of

Certiorari was granted on May 21, 1990.
This court has appellate jurisdiction over a judgment of the
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The question presented in this quiet title action is as
follows:

Does a judgment lien pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-22-1 attach to the retained legal title of a judgment debtor
who has sold real property under a contract of sale prior to
docketing of the judgment, when there is still a balance owing to
the judgment debtor by the contract vendee?
The Utah Court of Appeals held that pursuant to the doctrine
of equitable conversion, the seller!s retained legal title to
real property under an executory land sale contract is personal
property rather than real property, so that no judgment lien can
attach to the seller's interest.

Petitioners maintain that

equitable conversion is an equitable doctrine that is applied
only when necessary, and only to the extent necessary, to do
equity.

Accordingly, it should be held that a judgment lien does

attach against a vendor's retained legal title, although it may
be subject to equities in favor of third parties upon competent
proof of those equities.
This case was decided in the trial court (and in the Utah
Court of Appeals) on stipulated facts.
3

Therefore, this court may

sustain the Utah Court of Appeals' decision only if convinced of
its correctness.

Seef

Sacramento Baseball Club/ Inc. v. Great

Northern Baseball Co./ 748 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987).

Since

the issue is solely one of law, this court need not defer to the
Utah Court of Appeals1 decision.

See, Madsen v. Borthick/ 769

P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1:
"From the time the judgment of the district court or circuit
court is docketed and filed in the office of the clerk of the
district court of the county it becomes a lien upon all the real
property of the judgment debtor/ not exempt from execution/ in
the county in which the judgment is entered/ owned by him at the
time or by him thereafter acquired during the existence of said
i•
lien.

„1
..."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was commenced when the Clements, who were the
judgment creditors of George W. Barker Jr. and Lila M. Barker,
obtained a writ of execution against real property located in
Salt Lake County owned by the Cannefaxes.
previously owned the property.

The Barkers had

The Cannefaxes brought the action

against the Clements to quiet title to the property and to
restrain the Salt Lake County Sheriff from executing on the
judgment lien which the Clements contended they had against the
1. The entire statute is quoted in the Addendum to this
Respondents' Brief.

4

property.

The Clements counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment

that they were the holders of a judgment lien against the
property which was superior to the Cannefaxes1 interest.
The Clements moved for summary judgment upon stipulated
facts [R. 106-108]/ a copy of which is contained in the addendum
to this brief.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor

of the Clements/ holding that the lien of their judgment against
the Cannefaxes1 predecessor in interest (the Barkers) attached to
the real property to the extent of the unpaid balance under a
prior long term contract for the sale of the property.
The Cannefaxes appealed.

In a majority opinion the Utah

Court of Appeals held that pursuant to the doctrine of equitable
conversion the retained legal title of a vendor under an
executory land sale contract is personal property rather than
real property and no judgment can attach thereto under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-22-1.

The Court of Appeals reversed the summary

judgment granted in favor of the Clements and ordered the trial
court to enter summary judgment in favor of the Cannefaxes.
The Clements petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari
and that petition was granted on May 21/ 1990.
The facts upon which this case must be determined are not
disputed and were presented to the trial court by means of a
2
written stipulation. [R. 106-108].

2. The original Stipulated Facts do not appear to be in the
court file. However/ a copy signed by counsel for respondents is
at R. 105-108 and a copy signed by counsel for each side is
included in the addendum to this brief.
5

In 1981 George W. Barker Jr. and Lila M. Barker were fee
simple owners of the subject real property on Lockhart Road in
Salt Lake County ("the Lockhart Road property") (R. 106). The
property was subject to mortgage loan obligations in favor of
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association and Continental
Bank & Trust Company.

(R. 106). In 1981 the Barkers entered

into a Uniform Real Estate Contract to sell the Lockhart Road
property to Diane Hodge for $160/000/ payable $40/000 down and
the balance over a period of time with interest.

(R. 106). Ms.

Hodge caused a Notice of Contract to be recorded with the Salt
Lake County Recorder.

(R. 106).

In 1985 the Clements obtained a judgment in the Seventh
Judicial District Court of Uintah County against the Barkers in
the amount of $70,526.00.

(R. 106). The judgment was duly

docketed with the clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County.

(R. 106). The judgment was not appealed.

(R.

106) .
In September 1985/ one month after the Clements1 judgment
was docketed in Salt Lake County, the Barkers/ Diane Hodge/ and
the Cannefaxes entered into a two-way transaction with respect to
the Lockhart Road property.

At that time Hodge owed a balance of

$87/747.40 on her Uniform Real Estate contract and the prior
obligations to Prudential and Continental totaled $33/282.50.
(R. 107).

In the transaction/ the obligations in favor of

Prudential and Continental were satisfied/ the Barkers gave Hodge
a credit of $9,464.94, and Hodge paid the Barkers $45,000.00.
The Barkers then executed a warranty deed in favor of Hodge.
6

Hodge then executed a warranty deed In favor of the Cannefaxes.
(R
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The Cannefaxes1 and the Utah Court of Appeals1 reliance on
the doctrine of equitable conversion is misplaced because that
doctrine is only applied by courts when it is equitable that it
be applied.

In this case/ there are no such equities that would

require the court to resort to a fiction and find that the legal
titleholder of real property does not "own" the property.

The

Cannefaxes1 agent had actual notice of the judgment against the
Barkers prior to recording the deed from the Barkers to Hodge and
the deed from Hodge to the Cannefaxes/ but chose to proceed to
record those deeds and bind title insurance on the property.
Thus/ the equities of the transaction favor the Clements.
Application of the doctrine of equitable conversion will benefit
only the title company.
To mechanically apply the doctrine of equitable conversion
to cases where a judgment debtor has sold his real property on
contract but retains legal title/ serves only to convert an
equitable doctrine into a legal doctrine of universal application
without regard to the equities.
Finally/ application of the doctrine of equitable conversion
limits the effect of Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 which states in
broad and inclusive terms that upon being properly docketed a
judgment "becomes a lien upon all the real property of the
judgment debtor . . . owned by him."

In order to give effect to

the broad language of the statute/ and to avoid the uncertainty
that comes with application of an equitable doctrine/ this court
need only find that when property has been sold on contract/
which contract is executory/ both the vendor and vendee have an
8
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to real property retained by the vendor under an executory land
sale contract is not real property to which a judgment lien can
attach.

This conclusion is contrary to the general rule with

respect to the doctrine of equitable conversion.

That doctrine

has been described thusly:
"Equitable conversion is that constructive alteration
in the nature or character of property whereby, in equity/
real estate is for certain purposes considered as
personalty/ or whereby personalty/ for similar considerations/ is regarded as real estate/ and in either instance/
it is deemed to be transmissable and descendible in its
converted form. The doctrine of equitable conversion was
adopted for the purpose of giving effect to the intention of
the testator/ settlor/ or contracting parties/ and is not a
fixed rule of law but proceeds on equitable principles that
take into account the result to be accomplished. It is a
mere fiction/ resting on the principle that equity regards
things which are directed to be done as having actually been
done where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent
performance." 27 Am Jur 26, Equitable Conversion/ § 1, p.
483/ footnotes omitted.
There are limitations to the doctrine:
"The application of the doctrine of equitable conversion depends somewhat on the circumstances under which it is
invoked/ since the doctrine is not a fixed rule of law/ but
proceeds on equitable principles which take into account the
result to be accomplished. The doctrine is most frequently
applied in solving questions concerning the validity and
execution of trusts/ the legal character of the interests of
the beneficiaries/ the devolution of property as between
real and personal representatives/ and for other similar
purposes. Equitable conversion is not favored in law/ however/ and the doctrine does not exist as a matter of right.
It is to be invoked only when required by necessity and
justice. And even where required/ the conversion must be
kept within the limits of absolute necessity. The application of the doctrine is always withheld where its effect
would be contrary to the intention of the testator/ settlor/
or contracting parties. Moreover/ the doctrine will never
be employed for the purpose of circumventing public policy/
or to sustain a fraud or a wrongful act." Id./ § 3/ pp.
485-486/ footnotes omitted.
As stated in 46 Am Jur 2d Judgments § 266/ "The general rule
is that the interest of a vendor in lands contracted to be sold
10
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ment lien only attaches to an interest in real property§ 78-22-1.

U.C.A.

Therefore/ when the Butler opinion refers to "a

judgment lien against the vendorfs interest11/ it necessarily
refers to an interest in real property.
The general rule that a judgment lien does attach to the
retained title of a contract vendor has been applied in numerous
instances in other jurisdictions.

See First Security Bank v.

Rogers/ 429 P.2d 386 (Idaho 1967); May v. Emerson/ 96 P. 454 (Or.
1908); Heath v. Dodson/ 110 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1941); Monroe v.
Lincoln City Emp. Credit Union/ 279 N.W.2d 866 (Neb. 1979);
Scoular Grain Co. v. Pioneer Valley Sav. Bank/ 447 N.W.2d 38
(Neb. 1989); Mooring v. Brown/ 763 F.2d 386 (10th Cir. 1985)
[applying Colorado law]; Yarnall v. First Nat. Bank of Stillwater/ 74 B.R. 3 (D.S.D. 1986) [applying South Dakota law];
Uffenheimer v. Rob Con Enterprises/ Inc./ 425 N.Y.S.2d 856
(1980); and Lang v. Klinger/ 34 Cal.App.3d 987, 992, 110
Cal.Rptr. 532, 534-535 (1973).
First Security Bank v. Rogers, supra/ 429 P.2d 386/ cited
with approval in Butler v. Wilkinson/ is instructive.

In that

case/ Rogers sold certain real property in Nez Perce County on
contract to the Eatons in December 1959.

In January 1962, Nez

Perce Roller Mills obtained a judgment against the Rogers and
filed an abstract of the judgment in the Nez Perce County
recorder's office.

Subsequently/ other persons obtained

judgments against Rogers.. In April 1965/ the Eatons deposited a
lump sum final payment under the contract of sale into an escrow
account with First Security Bank.
12
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"Appellants contend that the doctrine of equitable
conversion must apply/ so that after execution of the
contract with the Eatons/ Rogers' interest in the property
was transformed from an interest in realty to an interest :in
personalty to which the judgment lien could not attach.
The doctrine of equitable conversion is a fiction
resting upon the fundamental rule of equity that equity
regards that as done which ought to be done
. ., . the doctrine is not oi ie o£ universal application.
Dean Pound has stated [quoting from Pound, The Progress of
the Law 1918-1919/ 33 Harv.L.Rev. 813, 831 (1920)]:
"When we speak of conversion we are not describing a
condition of the property for all purposes with respect
to everybody but are giving a name to a situation
resulting from the application of equitable doctrines
to a state of facts between certain parties."
The doctrine of equitable conversion generally does not
apply to the facts of the instant case. The majority rule
is that a judgment lien against a vendor after the making of
the contract of sale, but prior to making and delivery of
the deed, extends to all of the vendor's interest remaining
in the land and binds the land to the extent of the unpaid
purchase price . [ C i t a t i o n s ] . "" 4 2 9 P.2d at 389.
• See also, May v. Emerson/ 96 P.2d 454 (Or. 1908), which held

"It is beyond controversy that the title remains in the
vendor unti 1 the actual delivery of the deed. The vendor
still has not only the legal title, but also an interest in
the property as security for the payment of the purchse
price; and this interest should be and is available to a
creditor through the lien of his judgment .
. If the
purchase price is fully paid, although the deed is not
13

actually delivered/ the vendor having but the naked legal
title/ the judgment creditor can acquire no more.
[Citations.] But to the extent of the unpaid purchase price
the creditor's lien will bind the property . . .." 96 P. at
455.
May v. Emerson was followed in Heider v. DietZ/ 380 P.2d 619
(Or. 1963).

Heider/ however/ contains a misleading headnote

which states:

"Under 'equitable conversion1/ vendor's security

interest in land is treated as personalty not reached by docketing of judgment against vendor . . .."

In fact/ the headnote

trumpets the contention of the appellant in that case but the
Oregon Supreme Court rejected that contention and held that the
doctrine of equitable conversion would not be applied "under
facts making such application clearly improper."
In Monroe v. Lincoln City Emp. Credit Union/ 279 N.W.2d 866
(Neb. 1979)/ the Olsons contracted to sell their property in
Lancaster County on June 29/ 1977.

In July 1977/ the credit

union filed suit against the Olsons and obtained a default
judgment.

The credit union docketed the judgment in Lancaster

County on August 1,

1977.

On August 8/ 1977/ the Olsons

transfered the property to the plaintiffs by warranty deed.

As

in the instant case/ the plaintiffs in Monroe argued that the
Olsons1 interest in the property had been equitably converted
into personalty and therefore the judgment did not become a lien
against the realty.

The trial court agreed/ but the Nebraska

Supreme Court did not and reversed/ holding as follows:

"[T]he

doctrine of equitable conversion does not apply for all purposes
and in every situation where there is a contract for the purchase
of land.

[H]Equitable conversion is merely
14
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court and

held that under Colorado law the holders of the judgment lien had
a superior interest to that of the grantees under the subsequent
deed/ even though the grantees acquired title from one who purchased the property on contract from the judgment debtor prior to
entry of the judgment. 3
See also/ Uffenheimer v. Rob Con Enterprises/ Inc./ 425
N.Y.S.2d 856 (1980), wherein the court states:

"It has long been

the rule in this state, as in most others/ that the vendor's
interest in realty under an executory contract of sale is subject
to judgment liens to the extent that the purchase money remains
unpaid."
In this case it is stipulated that Diane Hodge owed the
Barkers $87/747.40 under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to
purchase the Lockhart Road property at the time the Clements
docketed their judgment against the Barkers in Salt Lake County.
The Barkers owed $33/282.50 on the property to two financial
institutions.

That left the Barkers with a remaining interest in

the Lockhart Road property of $54,464.90, and it is that amount
which the Clements are entitled to recover.

3. In Mooring, a title search was conducted and title insurance was obtained for the benefit of the plaintiffs, but the
search failed to reveal the existence of the judgment lien. In
the instant case, a title search for the benefit of the
Cannefaxes did reveal the judgment lien but the title insurer
bound insurance anyway. Mooring does not address the issue of
equitable conversion, but the court certainly did not apply the
doctrine.
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realty and the purchaser had taken possession and made all payments including taxes and water district obligations.

Upon the

husband!s death the wife attempted to claim a statutory dower
exclusion to limit the inheritance taxes due.

Since the wife had

entered into the contract to sell the property she had waived her
dower rights and there were no intervening factors to support a
refusal to apply equitable conversion to her remaining interest.
Accordingly, it was held that the widow could not claim a statutory dower exclusion.
Jelco, Incorporated v. Third Judicial District Court, 29
Utah 472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973), involved a proceeding in eminent
domain and the question was how the proceeds should be disbursed
as between the vendor and vendee under an executory contract for
the sale of the land.
parties to consider.

There were no intervening rights of third
This court determined that the vendor was

entitled to the value of his contract rights and the vendee was
entitled to any increased value in the land.
In each of these cases this court applied the equitable
conversion doctrine because, upon consideration of the facts
involved, it was equitable to do so.

In Reynolds v. Van Wagoner,

592 P.2d 593 (Utah 1979), this court declined to apply the
equitable conversion doctrine.

In that case an executory sale

contract provided that in the event the vendee failed to pay
taxes on the property the vendor could, at his option, pay said
taxes and reclaim the expense from the vendee.

The vendee failed

to pay the taxes from 1972 to 1975, whereupon the vendor paid the
taxes and received an auditor's tax deed.
18

The vendor claimed

ownership of the property rather than a mere right to reimbursement.

Among other things he asserted that equitable conversion

compelled this result.

This court rejected the claim, stating:

"Nor does the doctrine of equitable conversion afford Reynolds
any relief.

Although this court has on occasion applied that

doctrine to achieve equitable results, it cannot be invoked to
alter contractual commitments made by the parties, and is not
applicable to the situation at hand."

592 P.2d at 594.

C.
LACH V. DESERET BANK WAS ERRONEOUSLY DECIDED
AND SHOULD BE OVERRULED
The Utah Court of Appeals also relief upon its own case,
Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah App. 1987).

Lach

concluded, in part, that under the doctrine of equitable
conversion the vendor under a binding earnest money agreement
does not own an interest in real property to which a judgment
lien can attach.

However, this court is not bound by the Lach

decision, and Lach should be overruled.

The applicable holding

in Lach is dicta; it is not well reasoned or supported by the
cases cited in the opinion; and most importantly, it conflicts
with this court's opinion in Butler v. Wilkinson, supra, 740 P.2d
1244.
1.
The Lach Discussion on Equitable Conversion is Dicta
The Lach opinion's discussion of the doctrine of equitable
conversion is dicta.

In that case, an earnest money receipt and

offer to purchase property in Garfield County was signed on
November 28, 1980, by the Dewsnups as sellers and David Lach as
19

buyer.

On the same date the Dewsnups gave a quit-claim deed to

the property in favor of Foothill Properties/ a name under which
Lach conducted business.

On December 12, 1980, Deseret Bank

docketed a judgment against the Dewsnups in Garfield County.

In

part III of the opinion the Court of Appeals correctly held that
"A judgment creditor cannot place a lien against the property of
a judgment debtor's grantee."

746 P.2d at 804.

Since the

judgment debtors quitclaimed the property to Lach before the
judgment was docketed in Garfield County, the property no longer
legally belonged to the judgment debtors.

The discussion in part

IV of the opinion, concerning equitable conversion, was thus
unnecessary to a resolution of the appeal.
2.
Lach Conflicts With Butler v. Wilkinson
As discussed earlier in this brief, in Butler v. Wilkinson,
supra, 740 P.2d 1244 at 1257-1258, this court, albeit in dicta,
expressly recognized the propriety of a judgment lien against the
interest retained by a contract vendor ("Nor, for that matter, is
a judgment lien against the vendor's interest extinguished by the
vendor's sale of that interest to a third person").

The Lach

discussion of equitable conversion cannot be reconciled with this
court's statement to the contrary in Butler.
3.
The Cases Cited in the Lach Discussion of Equitable
Conversion Do Not Compel the Conclusion Reached
By the Court of Appeals in That Case Or
in This Case
The cases cited in the Lach discussion of equitable
conversion are the same ones relied upon by the Court of Appeals
20

in its opinion in this case:

Allred v. Allred/ supra, 15 Utah 2d

396, 393 P.2d 791; In re Estate of Willson, supra, 28 Utah 2d
197, 499 P.2d 1298? and Jelco, Incorporated v. Third Judicial
Dist. Court, supra, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739.
As discussed in part B of this Argument, those cases apply
the doctrine of equitable conversion, but on facts not at all
similar to those of the instant case.
D.
THERE ARE NO EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS IN THIS CASE
THAT WOULD PRECLUDE THE CLEMENTS1 JUDGMENT LIEN
FROM ATTACHING TO THEIR DEBTORS1 REMAINING
INTEREST IN THE LOCKHART ROAD PROPERTY
Utah's judgment lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1,
evidences a strong public policy in favor of satisfaction of
judgments.

Indeed, a judgment lien has always been regarded as

the highest form of security to a creditor.
P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1978).

Belnap v. Blain, 575

A judgment creditors lien on the

property interest of his debtor should not be disregarded based
on a legal fiction unless there are strong equitable considerations in favor of the debtor or some third party.
In the instant case there are no such equitable considerations.

When the Barkers gave a warranty deed to Diane Hodge

after the Clements1 judgment against the Barkers had been
docketed, Hodge had constructive notice of the existence of the
judgment lien.

So did Hodge's grantees, the Cannefaxes.

In

fact, prior to recording the deeds from the Barkers to Hodge and
from Hodge to the Cannefaxes, the settlement agent, Security
Title Agency did a title search which disclosed the Clements1
judgment.

At that point Hodge and the Cannefaxes, through their
21

agent/ had actual notice of the judgment.

Although the

stipulated facts do not explicitly so indicate/ it is clear that
when that final title search was done/ the deeds and the money
from the closing that went to the Barkers were in escrow.

The

title search which disclosed the judgment would not have been
conducted if it were then too late for the Cannefaxes to insist
that a newly-discovered encumbrance be cleared.

At that point in

time the Cannefaxes were in a position to protect themselves by
insisting that the judgment lien be cleared/ as they would have
every right to do in view of the fact that the Barkers were
warranting a clear title to Hodge/ and Hodge was warranting a
clear title to the Cannefaxes.

Instead/ for whatever reason/ the

settlement agent chose to ignore the judgment/ bind title insurance on the property/ and record the deeds.
The Clements recognize that their judgment lien was subject
to existing equities of third parties in the property as well as
prior encumbrances.

For that reason/ the Clements have always

acknowledged that they are entitled to foreclose on their
judgment only to the extent that Diane Hodge still owed the
Barkers on the Uniform Real Estate Contract less the amount of
prior encumbrances/ at time of delivery of the warranty deed from
the Barkers to her.

Thus/ the Cannefaxes did not risk the loss

of their equity in the property.

In other contexts this court

has held that a judgment lien attaches to a debtor's property
only to the extent that the value of the property exceeds exempt
amounts.

See, Gray v. Stevens, 5 Utah 2d 361, 302 P.2d 273
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(1956) (judgment lien attached to value of homestead property
only in excess of amount of homestead exemption).
Those equities existing in this case favor the judgment
creditors.

As stated by the trial court in ruling on the

Clements1 summary judgment motion:

"Now/ the question is/ if the

Court is to be persuaded to rule under equitable doctrines/ what
is or what isn't equitable?

Who was in the better position to

anticipate the ultimate implications of that cloud on title/ and
to deal with it at the time of purchase of the property by the
4
plaintiffs in this case?"
The answer is clear. Diane Hodge and
the Cannefaxes1 agent/ a title insurer/ became aware of the
existence of the judgment against the Barkers at a time when the
deeds had not been recorded and money available to apply toward
5
that judgment was not yet disbursed to the Barkers.
On the other hand/ a rule recognizing the doctrine of
equitable conversion in this case/ and holding that a contract
seller's retained interest in the property is personalty/ will
benefit only the title insurer who chose to bind insurance/

4. The transcript of the hearing on the summary judgment
motion is a part of the addendum to this brief.
5. The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals states that
the Clements "sat on their rights failing to pursue their
remedies. It is not inequitable that as a result they cannot
collect their judgment against a subsequent innocent purchaser."
Cannefax v. Clement/ 786 P.2d 1377, 1383 (Utah App. 1990). While
it is not a part of the record/ the fact is the Clements did not
know of the existence of the Lockhart Road property until
November 1986/ more than a year after the real estate closing.
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record the deeds, and disburse money to the Barkers after it
became aware of the Clements1 judgment.
E.
THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT BOTH THE VENDEE AND VENDOR
OF PROPERTY BEING SOLD ON CONTRACT HAVE AN OWNERSHIP
INTEREST WHICH MAY BE SUBJECT TO THE LIEN
OF A JUDGMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals also was mistaken in applying a
"parity of reasoning" approach to the issue of whether a contract
vendor's remaining interest in the property being sold is real or
personal property.

Relying on a single sentence of this court's

opinion in Butler v. Wilkinson, supra, 740 P.2d at 1255, in which
this court discussed the general concept of the doctrine of
equitable conversion, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that if
a contract vendee's interest in the property being purchased is
real property, then "by a parity of reasoning" the seller!s
retained interest must be personal property.
The Clements have absolutely no argument with the holding of
Butler that a contract vendee's interest in real property being
purchased on contract is subject to the lien of a judgment
against the vendee.

The Clements submit, however, that there is

no good reason why the vendor's interest may not also be subject
to the lien of a judgment against the vendor.

The courts of

several jurisdictions have recognized that both the vendor and
vendee have an ownership interest in real property being purchased on contract, either one of which might become subject to a
judgment lien.

Compare, e.g., Cascade Sec. Bank v. Butler, 567

P.2d 631 (Wash. 1977), holding that the vendee's interest may
become subject to a judgment lien, with Heath v. Dodson, supra,
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110 P.2d 845/ holding the same with respect to the vendor's
retained iaterest; Fulton v. Duro/ 700 P.2d 14 (Idaho 1985)
[vendee's interest]/ with First Security Bank v. Rogers/ supra/
429 P.2d 386 [vendor's interest]; and Fridley v. Munson/ 194 N.W.
840 (S.D. 1923) [vendee's interest] with Yarnall v. First Nat.
Bank of Stillwater/ supra/ 74 B.R. 3 [vendor's interest].
stated in Fridley v. Munson/ supra/ 194 N.W. at 841:

As

"[W]e can

see no valid reason why [the South Dakota judgment lien statute]
should not be held to include equitable as well as legal estates
it

In Cascade Sec. Bank v. Butler/ supra/ 567 P.2d 631/ the
Washington Supreme Court chose to avoid the "nebulous character"
of the equitable conversion doctrine altogether and simply hold
that a real estate contract vendee's interest is real estate
within the meaning of the Washington judgment lien statute/
stating:

"To base our decision upon this fiction would embark us

upon a case-by-case determination of the boundaries of the
doctrine in this State.

Rather we are content to limit ourselves

to the pertinent issue . . . and declare that a vendee's interest
is real estate within the meaning of the judgment lien statutes."
567 P.2d at 634.

In so doing/ that court's earlier holding in

Heath v. Dodson/ supra/ 110 P.2d 845/ was left intact.
The Clements urge this court to reach a like result.

The

extent to which a contract vendor's interest may be subject to a
judgment lien should be the amount still to be paid to the vendor
at the time the lien attaches; the extent to which a contract
vendee's interest may be subject to the lien of a judgment
25

against him should be measured by his equity in the property.
Such a result would give Utah's judgment lien statute the full
effect of its broad language.
Finally/ such a result would also comport with and give
emphasis to the language in Butler v. Wilkinson recognizing that
a vendor's retained interest in property sold on contract is
really no mere lien/ but is in fact legal title to the property/
subject to a conditional promise to convey at a future tieme.
740 P.2d at 1256 n. 6.

Unlike the trustee under a resulting or

constructive trust/ and unlike the contract seller who has
received the full purchase price but who has not yet given a
deed/ the contract seller under an executory land sale contract
does not have a mere naked title.

He retains the right to sell

that legal title to another/ subject to his vendee's interest.
He retains a right to regain possession of the property upon
default.

He retains the right to sue at law to prevent the

vendee from committing waste to the property while the contract
is executory.

6. Utah law recognizes the possibility of a third-person
having an interest in real property which Is subject to
execution. See Rule 69(e)(3)/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
"[W]hen the [execution] sale is of real property . . . or when a
portion of such real property is claimed by a third person- and
he requires it to be sold separately/ such portion must be thus
sold."
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F.
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE ADDITIONAL PUBLIC
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RAISED IN JUDGE BULLOCKfS
DISSENTING OPINION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
Finally, the Clements recomment to this court Judge
Bullock's dissent from the majority opinion in the Court of
Appeals.

Cannefax v. Clement/ supra, 786 P.2d 1377 at 1383-1391.

Judge Bullock1s dissenting opinion is clearly the product of much
thought and research.

The Clements respectfully submit that it

would be duplicative to repeat or paraphrase in full the points
raised in Judge Bullockfs dissenting opinion/ but they fully
adopt the reasoning of that dissent.
CONCLUSION
Based on the stipulated facts/ the arguments set forth in
this brief, and the arguments raised in the dissenting opinion of
Judge Bullock in the Court of Appeals, petitioners Donald and
Ruth Clement respectfully submit that this court should overrule
the decision and judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals and
reinstate the Summary Judgment in their f^vor entered by the
trial court.
Petitioners also respectfully submit that they should be
awarded their costs on appeal.
Dated this /7

day of July, 1990.
By

/^t/^
Steven H. Lybb^tt
ybbe
Attorney for Petitioners
Donald W. Clement and Ruth L,
Clement
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ADDENDUM
1.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1

2.

STIPULATED FACTS

3.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS [ON DEFENDANTS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT]

4.

ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

5.

OPINION, INCLUDING THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
OPINIONS, DELIVERED BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1
From the time the judgment of the district court or circuit
court is docketed and filed in the office of the clerk of the
district court of the county it becomes a lien upon all the real
property of the judgment debtor/ not exempt from execution/ in
the county in which the judgment is entered/ owned by him at the
time or by him thereafter acquired during the existence of said
lien.

A transcript of judgment rendered in a district court or

circuit court of this state/ in any county thereof/ may be filed
and docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court of
any other county/ and when so filed and docketed it shall h^ve/
for purposes of lien and enforcement/ the same force and effect
as a judgment entered in the district court in such county.

The

lien shall continue for eight years unless the judgment is
previously satisfied or unless the enforcement of the judgment is
stayed on appeal by the execution of a sufficient undertaking as
provided by law/ in which case the lien of the judgment ceases.

BRUCE E. COKE, Bar No. 0694
STEVEN H. LYBBERT, Bar No. 4187
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Defendants
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND P.L. CANNEFAX and
DEBRA CANNEFAX,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH L.
CLEMENT,
Defendants.

|
]
1
]
;
]I
;
1
]

STIPULATED FACTS

Civil No. C87-6232
Judge Pat B. Brian

Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, Rodney M.
Pipella, and defendants, by and through their attorneys, Steven
H. Lybbert and Bruce E. Coke of Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, stipulate
to the following facts.

In doing so, counsel agree that other

facts not stipulated to may be relevant to the issues raised in
the pleadings.
STIPULATED FACTS
1.

On August 28, 1981, George W. Barker, Jr. and Lila

M. Barker ("the Barkers") were fee simple owners of the real
property described in paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' Verified
Complaint ("the Lockhart Road property").

2.

On August 28, 1981, the Barkers entered into a

Uniform Real Estate Contract with Diane Hodge for sale of the
Lockhart Road property for the sum of $160,000.00, payable
$40,000.00 down and the balance over a period of time with
interest.
3.

At the time of the contract sale from the Barkers

to Diane Hodge, there existed prior mortgage loan obligations
against the property in favor of Prudential Federal Savings &
Loan Association ("Prudential") and Continental Bank and Trust
Company

("Continental").
4.

On August 31, 1981, Ms. Hodge caused a Notice of

Contract to be recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder as
Entry No. 3600195 at Book 5287, Page 315.
5.

On August 15, 1985, defendants Donald W. Clement

and Ruth L. Clement obtained a Judgment in the Seventh Judicial
District Court of Uintah County against the Barkers in the
amount of $70,526.00.
6.

On August 19, 1985, defendants1 Judgment was

docketed with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County in Docket Book 200 at Page 153.
7.

Defendants' Judgment against the Barkers was not

8.

On September 25, 1985, rminediately prior to the

appealed.

transaction described in the paragraphs which follow, the Barkers
held legal title to the Lockhart Road property, subject to Diane
-2-

Hodge's interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.1
9.

On September 25, 1985, Diane Hodge owed $87,747.40

under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the Barkers.

The prior

obligations to Prudential and Continental totaled $33,282.50.
10.

On September 25, 1985, the Barkers gave a Warranty

Deed to the Property to Diane Hodge.

The Warranty Deed was

recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder on September 26, 1985
as Entry No. 4142674 at Book No. 5694, beginning at Page 1268.
11.

On September 25, 1985, at the time of delivery of

the Warranty Deed referred to in paragraph 10, Diane Hodge paid
the Barkers $45,000.00, and the Barkers gave Ms. Hodge a credit
of $9,464.94.

The mortgage loan balance in favor of Prudential

in the sum of $5,960.20 was paid off, as was the mortgage loan
balance in favor of Continental in the sum of $27,322.30.
12.

Also on September 25, 1985, Diane

Hodge gave a

Warranty Deed to the Property to plaintiffs Raymond P.L. Cannefax
and Debra Cannefax.

The Warranty Deed was recorded with the Salt

Lake County Recorder on September 26, 1985, as Entry No. 4142675
at Book No. 5694, beginning at Page 1270.
13.

The two transactions discussed above—the transfer

of title from the Barkers to Diane Hodge, and the transfer of
title from Diane Hodge to plaintiffs—took place at a single real
estate closing.

A true and correct copy of the U.S. Department

1. After entering into the contract with Ms. Hodge, the Barkers
gave quit claim deeds to the property to other people named
Barker—presumably their children. On or before September 25,
1985, but prior to the other transactions of September 25, the
Barkers received back quit claim deeds to the property from their
quit claim grantees.
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of Housing and Urban Development Settlement Statement between
Diane Hodge and plaintiffs is attached hereto.
14.

A title search conducted by the settlement agent,

Surety Title Agency, between closing on September 25, 1985 and
recording on September 26, 1985 disclosed defendants' Judgment
against the Barkers.
Dated this jQfi

day of December, 1987.

Rojkl^ M. Pipella
Awrorney
rorney for Plainti
Plaintiffs

Dated this

i*E

day of December, 1987.
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

A^^i^^

By

Steven H. Lybtfert
Attorneys for Defendants

-4-

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
•

*

*

RAYMOND P.L. CANNEFAX and
DE3RA CANNEFAX,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. C87-S232
-vsHonorable Pat B. Brian
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH
L. CLEMENT,

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants•
•

*

*

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Salt Lake City, Utah
February 29, 19188
•

*

*

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiffs:

RODNEY M. PIPELLA
643 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

For the Defendants:

STEVEftf H. LYB3ERT
350 Sbutn 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111

BRAD J. YOUNG
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

CQPJ

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Cannefax vs. Clement, C87-6232.

Counsel

will state an appearance for the record, please.
MR, LYBBERT:

Steven Lybbert for the defendants.

MR. PIPELLA:

Rodney Pipella for the plaintiffs.

THE COURT:

You may proceed.

MR. LYBBERT:

We would move for summary judgment

both as to the complaint and on the counterclaim for
declaratory relief that has been filed.
believe, stipulated —

The parties have, I

they certainly stipulated to facts, and

I think the facts they have stipulated to are sufficient to
resolve all the issues involved on both the complaint and
counterclaim.
Briefly, to paraphrase those facts, Mr. and
Mrs. Barker owned a piece of property.

They entered into a

uniform real estate contract with Dianne Hodge to sell that
property.

Thereafter, the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Clement,

obtained a judgment against the Barkers, and docketed that
judgment in Salt Lake County.

About a month after the

judgment had been docketed Dianne Hodge paid off the contract
and obtained a deed to the property, and on that same day she
sold the property again by warranty deed to the plaintiffs,
the Cannefaxes.

At the time that Dianne Hodge obtained her

warranty deed from the Barkers, and at the time that she gave
a warranty deed to the plaintiffs, the Cannefaxes, she owed

2

1

about $88,000 on the contract.

2

approximately, owing to a couple of lenders who had first and

3

second position.

4

off.

5

paid the remaining $45,000 to the Barkers.

6

judgment lien —

7

been docketed was discovered between closing and recording of

8

the various deeds the next day.

9

THE COURT:

10

Thefe was $33,000,

At the closing thqse two lenders were paid

The Barkers gave Dianne Hodge a $9,000 credit, and she
The fact that the

excuse me, the fact that the judgment had

So there is

—

What was the amount of the judgment

obtained by the plaintiffs?

11

MR. LYBBERT:

Approximately $70,000.

12

I believe the issue is whether that judgment, when

13

it was docketed in Salt Lake County, became a lien on the

14

interest that the Barkers retained in the property —

15

certainly had legal title to the property —

16

and I believe that the case law and treatises support me, that

17

the general rule is that when a judgment is obtained against a

18

person who owns property, who has sold that property on

19

contract, then the lien attaches to the property, to the

20

extent that the contract remains unpaid, which in this case,

21

as of the date that they had actual knowledge of the judgment

22

and the fact it had been docketed in Salt Lake County, it

23

was —

24

two prior lenders, that leaves $54,0p0.

25

they

it is my position

after you take away the $33,000 that was owed to the

I believe the determinative case is Butler vs.

Wilkinson, which is discussed in both my memorandum and my
reply to Plaintiff's opposition to the motion.

It clearly

recognizes the possibility of a judgment lien against the
contract vendor's interest, and clearly states that a judgment
lien against the vendor's interest is not extinguished by the
vendor's sale of that interest to a third person.
My memorandum will certainly go into more detail
than I want to now, unless you want more detail.

I feel

confident that the memoranda that I submitted states my
position pretty clearly.

The plaintiffs suggest that the

Clements' remedy should have been to perhaps garnish Dianne
Hodge, but that ignores the fact they didn't know that the
Barkers owned this property, this particular piece of
property, until after they docketed their judgment in Salt
Lake County, and in fact after —

long after the property had

then been sold —

or a deed had been given from the Barkers to

the Hodges and —

the Barkers to Dianne Hodge and from Dianne

Hodge to the Cannefaxes.
THE COURT:

Counsel, one more time, in addition to

the factual transaction, outline for the Court, put the dates
in.

Start from the time that the Barkers sell, and then

indicate the dates when the Clements' obtained their judgment,
when it was recorded, and then when the property was sold
again.
MR. LYBBERT:

The Barkers sold the property on

4

contract on August 28, 1981.
THE COURT:

And that sale was to Hodges?

MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:

Right, to Hodge.

And that was when?

MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:

August 28, 1981.

Go ahead.

MR. LYBBERT:

On August 15, 1985, the Clements

obtained their judgment for $70,526.
THE COURT:

Was it recorded again?

MR. LYBBERT:

It was recorded or docketed in Salt

Lake County four days later, on August 19, 1985,
THE COURT:

The Clements obtained and recorded a

judgment for how much?
MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:

$70,526.

Against?

MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:

Mr. and Mrs. George Barker.

Both?

MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

And that occurrled on what date?

MR. LYBBERT:

They obtained the judgment on August

15, 1985, and that was in Uintah County.
THE COURT:

It is the recording that's critical.

MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:

August 19, 1985.

August 19,

MR. LYBBERT:

1985f?

Correct.

5

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

MR. LYBBERT:

Take it on through.

About 36 days later, on September 25,

1985, the Barkers gave a warranty deed to Dianne Hodge, and on
that same day and immediately thereafter Dianne Hodge gave a
warranty deed to Mr. and Mrs. Cannefax.
THE COURT:
what, September

The Barkers gave their warranty deed on

—

MR. LYBBERT:

25.

THE COURT:

1985?

MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:

Correct.
To the Clements?

MR. LYBBERT:

No, to Dianne Hodge.

The Clements are

the judgment creditors.
THE COURT:

What did she do with it?

MR. LYBBERT:

On that same day she gave a warranty

deed to the plaintiffs in this action, Mr. and Mrs. Cannefax.
THE COURT:
MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:
MR. LYBBERT:

On what date?
Also September 25, 1985.
Go ahead.
Those are the dates and transactions

that the parties have stipulated to.

It is not in the

stipulated facts, but then it was probably late 1987, fall of
1987, that the Clements discovered the existence of this
property, and sought to foreclose on the judgment lien, and in
response the Cannefaxes brought this action to find that they

6

1

have title

—

2

THE COURT:

Superior

3

MR. LY3BERT:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. LYBBERT:

—

Superior to the judgment lien.
Go ahead.
Back then, on September 25, 1985,

6

there was a balance due on that uniform real estate contract

7

of approximately —

8

there were obligations owed to two different lending

9

institutions, totaling $33,000.

I think it was $88,000.

And at that time

So it is my position that the

10

Barkers, as of the date that —

11

as of the date they gave the deed to Hodge, still had an

12

interest attached by the judgment lieti of $54,000.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. LYBBERT:

15

THE COURT:

16
17
18

Is that the amount in dispute today?
Yes.
So the Clements are now trying to go

against the property in the amount of $54,000?
MR. LYBBERT:

That's correct.

everything to the nearest

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. LYBBERT:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. LYBBERT:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. PIPELLA:

25

the judgment debtors, Barkers,

I am rounding

thousand.

Against the Cannefaxes?
Yes.
Anything

furthe*?

No.
Counsel?
Your Honor, the argument of the

Cannefaxes is that at the time the uniform real estate

7

contract was entered into, in August of 1981, between the
Barkers and Dianne Hodge, that equitable conversion took
place, the theory of equitable conversion should be applied to
determine the interest of the parties on that date, and for
the remainder of the life of the contract.
THE COURT:

What would have a title check

accomplished on this?
MR. PIPELLA:

The title check at that time would

have disclosed that the Barkers held title to the property.
Dianne Hodge at the time that she bought the property in
August of 1981 had recorded a notice of interest, disclosing
the interest of her contract.
THE COURT:

But supposing that on the morning of the

transaction, September 25, 1985, there had been an update on
the title policy, would not the recorded lien have been
exposed?
MR. PIPELLA:

Your Honor, I think as part of the

stipulated facts the title company that had done the date
down, from the date of the prior commitment to the date of
closing, did discover the Clement judgment as being docketed
against the Barkers.
THE COURT:
MR. PIPELLA:

Doesn't that put a buyer on notice?
Your Honor, our position is that

equitable conversion makes Dianne Hodge the owner of the real
property, and that what the Barkers had at the time they

8

executed the contract was a personal property interest, a
security interest.
THE COURT:

Supposing they had backed out on the

deal •
MR. PIPELLA:

Who had backed out on the deal?

THE COURT:

The Barkers.

Would they not still have

retained title of the property subject to the recorded lien?
MR. PIPELLA:

They couldn't have backed out on the

deal after August of 1981.
THE COURT:
MR. PIPELLA:

Why not?
Because they had entered into a

uniform real estate contract and they owed Dianne Hodge the
deed.

If she performed, she could have sued for specific

performance.
THE COURT:

If for some reason they had developed

sellers1 remorse or some other proble|m arose and they said,
Sue us, we don't want to go through with this deal, we have an
emotional attachment to the property, we want to give it to
our grandchildren, we don't want to go through with it, you
sue us, what would have been the basis for the lawsuit, absent
an action for specific performance?

What would have been — .
j

MR, PIPELLA:

Dianne Hodge pought the property, and

was entitled to obtain the benefit of her bargain.

The

uniform real estate contract provides three separate remedies
in paragraph 16, section 16, for nonperformance.

Paragraph

9

16(a) provides a forfeiture provision, (b) allows the seller
to sue the buyer for back installments, and paragraph 16(c)
allows the contract seller to convey title and foreclose on
the title as a mortgage —
mortgage.

foreclose on the contract as a

At the time, in September or August of 1985, at the

time that the Clements obtained their judgment, Dianne Hodge
had paid 50 percent of the purchase price,
THE COURT:

When did she enter into the contract

with the Barkers?
MR. PIPELLA:
THE COURT:

In 1981.
When?

MR. PIPELLA:
THE COURT:

August.
When?

MR. PIPELLA:
THE COURT:

August 29.
That was the day after —

that was

several days after the judgment was recorded against the
property?
MR. PIPELLA:
in August of 1981.

No.

Dianne Hodge bought the property

The Clements docketed their judgment in

August of 1985, four years later.

And then Dianne Hodge, in

September of 1985, roughly 30 days following the docketing of
the Clements1 judgment in Salt Lake County, resold the
property to my clients.

In that resale transaction, the

Cannefaxes refinanced the property, and paid cash.

Therefore,

Dianne Hodge had enough money to pay off the Cannefaxes.

She

10

paid them off in 1985, on a contract, that she had entered
into with in 1981.

Dianne Hodge had been in the possession of

the property, had paid taxes.

the Barkers couldn't have

backed out at that particular point in time.

Dianne Hodge had

used it as her residence for four or five years.
Our argument, your Honor, is at the time the uniform
real estate contract is entered into, in August of 1981, that
Dianne Hodge became the owner of the real property, and the
doctrine of equitable conversion so States.

The doctrine of

equitable conversion is well described in the Butler vs.
Wilkinson case, which is cited in both of our memorandums.
The uniform real estate contract is Characterized in Butler
vs. Wilkinson as a financing instrument, with the interest of
the vendor, in this case the Barkers; being that as a
mortgagee, just like any other mortgage holder.
personal property interest.

You have a

The vendee is really the owner,

and in Butler vs. Wilkinson they discuss that ownership
interest.

They have the risk of loss.

are required to obtain insurance*

They are the ones that

1^ the property were

damaged or destroyed, they would be the ones that would suffer
that loss post-contract.

They are also the ones that have the

right to occupy the property.
THE COURT:

Had she in fact been in occupancy

exclusively for that four-year period
MR. PIPELLA:

Df time?

When the contract closed in 1981, she

11

1

moved in and used it for her residence.

At the time that she

2

sold the property to my clients, she and her husband I believe

3

had been transferred out of state, and were living in

4

Minnesota, which I believe is where they were contacted

5

isn't it Minnesota?

6

MR. LYBBERT:

That's correct.

7

MR. PIPELLA:

Living in Minnesota in 1985.

8

been occupying the property.

9

this case, we are —

—

She had

Now, in the instant case, in

if you follow Mr. Lybbert f s arguments, we

10

are asked to treat a contract different than other security

11

interests in a particular piece of property.

12

estate contract, in our position, your Honor, is nothing more

13

than another method to finance the sale of property.

14

should be treated as such.

15

with judgment liens and when and on what property they become

16

judgments, what property they become liens once docketed,

17

describes that the judgment becomes a lien on the real

18

property owned by the judgment debtor.

19

client —

20

can look at that word "owner" and say that there were two

21

owners of the real property at the time that the Clements

22

docketed their judgment.

23
24
25

And it

Utah code, at 78-22-1, dealing

Dianne Hodge was the owner.

THE COURT:

A uniform real

Your Honor, my
I don f t think that we

Do you have a legal and an equitable

owner?
MR. PIPELLA:

Yes.

You have an equitable owner of

12

the real property, which was Dianne Hodge.

And the Barkers at

that time had a security interest in the contract.

At the

time the judgment was'docketed, Dianne Hodge had paid almost
50 percent of the property value.
THE COURT:

Whose name was the property still in?

MR. PIPELLA:

The property in 1985, at the time the

judgment was docketed, title was still vested in the Barkers.
THE COURT:
it —

The Court's next question is, would

do not the recording statutes operate to put a buyer on

notice that even up until the moment the transaction is
finalized there ought to be an update on the title check of
the property?

Wouldn't an addendum to the title of that

property have reflected and sent up red flags to your clients
that the title to the property they were buying was
encumbered, there was a cloud on it, there was a question
about ownership?
MR. PIPELLA:

Well, the ownership, your Honor —• the

answer to your question is yes, because there in fact was a
search done, and they did search the title name, the Barkers
and Dianne Hodge, and they searched the title judgment docket
records for the name of my client as well.
THE COURT:

Did the recorded judgment

MR. PIPELLA:

—

The docketed judgment I believe did

show up in that search.
THE COURT:

What would a reasonable, prudent buyer

13

do in that case?

Wouldn't they have required the seller of

that property to impound funds or to take other steps to
guaranty the full value of the purchase?
MR. PIPELLA:

Your Honor, ray clients weren't aware

of the docketing of the judgment.

Now, the title insurance

company that closed the transaction was their agent, was also
the agent for Dianne Hodge.

Our position is that if a uniform

real estate contract is a financing instrument, and Dianne
Hodge was the equitable owner of the real property, and the
Barkers held the personal property interest
THE COURT:
MR. PIPELLA:
record title —

—

And were the legal owners.
Had fee title —

not fee title, but

that the docketing of the judgment says it is

a lien against real property owned by the judgment debtor.

At

this particular point in time, all that the Barkers had was a
security interest, and it was personal property.

What I am

requesting and our point is that if Barkers had given a deed
and taken back a note and deed of trust, we wouldn't be having
this particular argument.

Or if they had given a deed and

taken back an all-inclusive note and deed of trust and wrapped
the two prior encumbrances, we wouldn*t be having this
argument.

It is inequitable, where you have a contract sale,

to treat it any differently than you would where the seller,
the vendor, had given a deed and taken back a note and deed of
trust.

In both cases, your Honor, where he had taken back a

14

note and deed of trust or had sold the property on contract,
he has the identical interest-

He hats a personal property

interest in the property itself, and the judgment doesn't
attach.
One of the items that Mr. Lybbert and the defendants
don't bring up is that what if Dianne Hodge had just
accelerated her payments?
would her exposure be?

What if she had paid it off?

What

Is it incumbent on her, before she

makes every installment, to run and have the title checked?
assert, your Honor, that
THE COURT:
MR. PIPELLA:
the seller.

I

—

Judgment against the property.
In this case it is a judgment against

But it puts the contract buyer in a position

where they can't freely make the payments and can't freely
deal with the seller for fear that a judgment comes of record
against the seller, and they have to go down and check the
record every time they make a payment.

If Dianne Hodge had

come into a windfall and had made the payment in this
particular case, we may still be having the very same
argument.

That, your Honor, is inequitable.

It is unfair.

You have to treat the contract buyer as the owner of the real
property, treat the seller as a mortgagee.

That's what he is.

In this particular case the Barkers -- if Dianne Hodge had
defaulted in August of 1985, the Barkers, according to the
terms of the contract, would have to have conveyed the

15

1

property, according to the terms of section 16(c), to Dianne

2

Hodge, and then foreclosed on the property as a mortgage.

3

Your Honor, I assert that what the —

that what the

4

Barkers had at the time was only a personal property interest,

5

and that the cases that have been cited on our behalf describe

6

the interest.

7

principally are Butler vs. Wilkinson, in re: Willson's estate,

8

and Allred vs. Allred.

9

describes the interest of the contract seller.

The three cases that we have relied upon

In those three cases, your Honor, it
The interest

10

of the contract seller is personal property, is that of a

11

mortgagee.

12

The statute 78-22-1 says real property owned by the

13

judgment debtor.

14

the cases that we have cited, and apply that to 78-22-1, in

15

determining whether or not —

16

against whom would a judgment attach as a lien to the

17

property, I think the only conclusion is, your Honor, that the

18

real property interest was held by Dianne Hodge, and the fact

19

that a judgment was docketed against the Barkers prior to the

20

time she paid them off and took the deed should be treated

21

just as if the Barkers held a mortgage on the property.

22

If we have —

if we are to give effect to

you know, who is the owner, and

In that particular case, if they held a mortgage on

23

the property, held a security interest, then a judgment

24

docketed against them would not be a lien on the property.

25

Your Honor, I am saying if there was a mortgage, it should be

16

1

treated just like —

2

contract shouldn't make any difference to our determination

3

here.

4

should be treated as a mortgage.

5

pardon me, the mere fact there was a

The contract, as far as the Barkers were concerned,

THE COURT:

Supposing the buyer had defaulted

6

someplace along the line, they had been in possession of the

7

property four or five years, and falll on hard times, and

8

defaulted, then what is the legal position of the original

9

seller?

10

MR. PIPELLA:

Sir, your Honor, depending on the

11

amount of the payment that has been Received, I can't quote

12

you chapter and verse from the Utah cases that establish when

13

a forfeiture is proper, but part of the problem we are faced

14

with here is that these land sale contracts have been treated

15

as executory contracts'.

16

the seller is excused from performance.

17

land sale contracts, it is not always true that the seller 1 s

18

performance is excused by a default by the buyer.

19

particular case, Dianne Hodge paid 25 percent down when she

20

bought the property in 1981.

21

She paid $40,000 down.

22 \

the date that she

23

highly unlikely that one month following the date of her

If there is a default by the buyer,
In Utah, dealing with

In this

It was $160,000 purchase price.

And depending on if —

depending on

would have defaulted after that, it is

24 I default that the Court would have allowed a forfeiture.
25

THE COURT:

What about four years?

17

MR. PIPELLA:

Your Honor, she had paid more money

after four years, because by the time we got to September of
1985, she had reduced that $120,000 balance that was on the
contract in August of 1981 down to $87,000.

She had paid

almost 50 percent of the purchase price in four years.

And

under no circumstances would a Utah court allow a forfeiture
when the buyer had paid 50 percent of the purchase price over
four years.

The Court would require that the seller foreclose

on that contract like a mortgage, utilizing 16(c).
Our position is that —

as well as one of the other

points we make in our memorandums, was that the contract was
no longer executory, in that performance, default in August of
1985, at the time that the Clements obtained their judgment,
would not have excused the Barkers1 performance.

In order to

have foreclosed on Dianne Hodge at that time, the contract
required and the Utah case law would have required them to
convey the property to Dianne Hodge and foreclose on that
contract as a mortgage, pursuant to 16(c) of that contract.
And so the contract was not even an executory contract in
August of 1985.
THE COURT:

As a practical matter, if the Court

ruled in your favor, what would be the remedies of all of the
parties?
MR. PIPELLA:

Your Honor, the remedy that would

exist in this case for the Clements would be the same remedy
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1

that would exist for the Clements if the Barkers had taken

2

back a note and a mortgage.

3

Clements weren't aware of this contract sale at the time they

4

had docketed their judgment.

5

on the matter, because I didn't figure that was ever really

6

that important in order to argue this particular motion.

I recognize the fact that the

I haven't taken their deposition

7

But their remedy, the cases also that we have cited,

8

in particular the Dahl vs. Prince case that's mentioned in our

9

memorandum, is that a judgment creditor isn't a bona fide

10

purchaser, and that a judgment creditor takes the debtor's

11

interest as he has it in the property.

12

better position, doesn't have any worse position, because he

13

obtains his judgment.

14

He doesn't have any

The remedy that I see on behalf of the Clements is

15

that they —

16

our memorandum —

17

they have every right to do.

18

hearing, through supplementary proceedings, find out what the

19

assets are, and they can execute on the contract, and take the

20

Barkers' position.

21

they can demand payment from Dianne Hodge.

22

again, it is cited in our memorandum, proposed in
is that they just execute on the note, which
They can take a supplementary

And once they are in that position, then

One of the cases that was ciited by the defendant is

23

an Oregon case by the name of May vs. Emerson.

In that

24

particular case —

25

and it has been utilized by the defendants to support their

it is again mentioned in both memoranda —•

19

position that the judgment debtor —
lien on the real property —

judgment creditor has a

but the remainder of the case

says, yes, he does have a lien, but in order to get the
contract buyer to make the payments to the judgment creditor,
the judgment creditor has to put himself in a position of a
contract seller.

He has to execute on the contract, and put

himself into the position of the seller.
payments from the buyer.

Then he can demand

If the buyer happens to pay off the

contract prior to the time that the judgment creditor places
himself in a position of the seller, so be it.

It is not the

buyer's responsibility to collect money for the judgment
creditor.
THE COURT:

Anything further?

MR. PIPELLA:

I think we have talked about

everything I had in mind, your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:
Counsel.

Response?
Just briefly, your Honor.
Answer the Court's question posed to

If the Court rules in favor of the Cannefaxes, as a

practical matter how is the case going to unravel?
MR. LYBBERT:

There is no more remedy.

As of the

day after that closing, back in September of 1985, when the
money was disbursed, unless their judgment lien had some
value, they really had no further remedy, the Barkers —

this

is not in the stipulated facts, either, but they are now with

20

bankruptcy, no way to go back against them, look to them for
further relief.

I didn't quite follow how Mr, Pipella

suggested that we go after the Hodgds.
THE COURT:

Nor did the Court.

MR. LYBBERT:

They sold their interest.

her interest, I should say.

She sold

I think there is no more remedy

for the Clements.
THE COURT:

Counsel, you a^e just ready to say

something.
MR. PIPELLA:

I am.

MR. LYBBERT:

I would be glad to let him interrupt.

THE COURT:
the hearing.

Go ahead.

I am £orry.

We have allowed an hour for

The Court anticipates that the ruling today is

going to be dispositive of all of th£ issues.

Let's resolve

it to your satisfaction as far as argument goes.
MR. PIPELLA:

I think what prompted me to want to

say something was the remedy against Hodge.
that there is a remedy against the Hedges.

I don't think
I think the remedy

for the Clements was always against tjhe Barkers, except they
had received payment from Dianne Hodge prior to executing on
the contract and placing, themselves in the Barkers1 position.
THE COURT:

They become a conduit, a legal conduit

for the Clements to go against the Hodges, and if that legal
conduit is now insulated by a bankruptcy, then they have no
remedy against Hodge.

21

MR. PIPELLA:

Hodge paid all of the money.

in full, in August of 1985.

She paid

And the Barkers got the money.

The issue is now the defendants are seeking to enforce their
lien against the real property.
THE COURT:

The Court understands that.

If the

Court rules in favor of the Cannefaxes today, then what do the
Clements do to obtain satisfaction on the $54,000 judgment?
And talk about that for a moment as you argue to the Court the
purpose of recording statutes.

What is the underlying purpose

of the recording statutes in this state?
MR. PIPELLA:

The statute 78-22-1 specifies at the

time the judgment is docketed that the judgment is on all of
the real property owned by the debtor.
someone —

when you have —

And if —

and when

I am going to argue in the

hypothetical here, because I don't think the Barkers had a
real property interest at the time the judgment was
docketed —

when that judgment is docketed, it becomes a lien

on all the real property.

When somebody else buys the

property from the judgment creditor, or makes a loan to the
judgment creditor, it is put on notice
THE COURT:
MR. PIPELLA:

—

It is subject to a lien.
But my position is that Dianne Hodge

bought the property from the Barkers four years prior, and
became the owner at the time that she bought the property, and
the only reason we are having this discussion is over the

22

financing method that was chosen by the parties at closing.
If there had been an all-inclusive note and deed of trust
utilized or if the Barkers had taken a third note, a note
secured by a third deed of trust, we wouldn't be having this
argument, this discussion, and my position is that the
contract is just like a note and a mortgage.
instrument.

It is a security

The fact that the judgment was docketed doesn't

affect Dianne Hodge f s interest in the real property.
THE COURT:
MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:

Counsel?
Is there a Question pending?
Do you have anything else you would like

to say?
MR. LYBBERT:

Yes.

The fact is that they didn't/5«f]

sell this property by contract.
legal title.

By doing so, they retained

I really, truly believe the supreme court has

spoken to the matter, Butler vs. Wilkinson case, where they
clearly recognized the existence and the validity of a
judgment lien against the vendor's Remaining interest.

They

say —

let me quote this again, sincle we do have a little

time.

"Nor for that matter is a judgment lien against the

vendor's interest extinguished by thle vendor's sale of that
interest."

By definition, a judgmenlt lien only attaches to

real property, not personal property.

Therefore, when the

Butler opinion refers to a judgment lien against the vendor's
interest, it necessarily refers to ah interest in real
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property.
Therefore, the supreme court is saying that the
vendor in fact does retain an ownership interest in real
property, and not just a security interest, at least as
between —

when you bring this third party, this judgment

creditor into the situation, as between a two-party situation
where the only two interests you are talking about is that of
the vendor and the vendee, then application of this doctrine
of equitable conversion may and frequently is found to be
perfectly appropriate.

But when you are talking about the

interest of a third person, then you are not going to
automatically apply that doctrine of equitable conversion.

In

this case you certainly don't.
We are not asking, we are not suggesting that we are
entitled to foreclose up to the full amount of the value of
the property or even up to the judgment amount.

What we think

we are entitled to is that amount that was due, not even on
the date that the judgment was docketed, but on the date a
month later when the double closing occurred and Barkers gave
title, gave a deed to Clement, and Clement gave a deed to the
Cannefaxes.

That's the date we are looking to, to determine

what interest Barkers still had that was subject to this
judgment lien.

That amount is the $54,000 we talked about in

the memorandum.
Mr. Pipella has cited some cases where the Utah
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1

court has applied the doctrine of equity conversion.

In each

2

of those cases it is a case of looking between the vendor and

3

the vendee how you are going to characterize the vendor's

4

interest.

5

talking about today, whether the judgment lien attaches to the

6

vendor's interest, have acknowledged the existence of the

7

doctrine of equity conversion and s^id we are not going to

8

apply it in this case.

9

applied in every instance, and almost without exception.

Those cases, which have considered the issue we are

It is an equitable doctrine, not to be

10

There are cases that have just flat but, without much

11

analysis, said the judgment lien doesn't attach to a vendor's

12

remaining interest.

13

have quoted in my memorandum from Am1 Jur, is

The majority rule, as I have stated, I

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. LY3BERT:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. LYBBERT:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. LYBBERT:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. LYBBERT:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. LYBBERT:

24

THE COURT:

25

peace.

—

Is this in yout reply?
No.

It is in my initial memorandum.

What page?
46 Am Jur 2nd.

Which page?
Page 5 of my original memorandum.

All right.
H a v e y o u rea<$ t h a t ?
Yes.
I will submit it, your Honor.

Submit?

Or el^e forever hold your

You have whatever opportunity you would like to
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1

respond.

2

customary rules on arguing motions for summary judgment,

3

because the Court's ruling this morning is going to be

4

determinative of the case, and you should have every

5

opportunity, both of you, to argue whatever you would like,

6

irrespective of the standard format in these matters.

7

your client 1 s remedy, as a practical matter, if the Court

8

rules against him?

9
10
11

The Court has relaxed considerably this morning its

MR. PIPELLA:

What is

Your Honor, the client's remedy is

probably a claim against the title insurance.
THE COURT:

And the Court keeps coming back to that

12

position in its attempt to rule properly on this case.

13

is the underlying purpose of a recording statute?

14

in fact does not put the owner —

15

buyer's agent on notice that there is a cloud on title and a

16

contingency ought to be made to remove* that cloud, then the

17

recording statutes really have no eff€»ct.

18

MR. PIPELLA:

What

And if that

or the buyer, rather, or the

Your Honor, and I agree.

But all of

19

my comments have been made that the Beirkers simply did not

20

have an interest to which the lien attached at the time the

21

judgment was docketed.

22

They were mortgagees.

23

THE COURT:

It was a personal property interest.

Would your argument be any stronger if

24

the dispute were between the original buyer and the original

25

seller as opposed to a third party now, as Counsel has

26

alluded?
MR. PIPELLA:

Your Honor, if —

the application of

equitable conversion between the seller and the buyer has
always applied to a third party.

In the cases that have been

cited, in Butler, we are looking at a third-party judgment
creditor.

In the Kartchner case, we use the State Tax

Commission as an adverse party, depending on whether or not
the seller's interest was held to be personal or real
property.

It always applied to a third party, as between the

seller and the buyer. If no third p£rty ever makes a claim or
there is no possibility that a third party would make a claim,
then there is no need to argue that equitable conversion has
taken place.

The argument is there to protect the buyer

against potential claims made against his seller, in order to
protect him, to give him, the buyers tne benefit of the
bargain, the benefit of his bargain;
MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:
MR. LYBBERT:

One last wo|:d, your Honor?
You may.
In the Butler vs. Wilkinson case, they

considered the doctrine of equitably conversion and found it
applicable in order to find that a judgment lien could attach
to the vendee's interest.

That certainly doesn't mean that

—

it just doesn't mean there is only one of those two interests
that a judgment lien can attach to.

In this case it is easy

to separate and determine, and we stipulated what the vendor's

27

interest was, financially speaking, and what the vendee's
interest was.

The vendor's interest was that $54,000 that was

still owed him at the time of this closing in September of
1985.

The doctrine of equitable conversion is just that.

is equitable doctrine.
notVapplied.
applied.

It

If it is equitable to apply it, it is

If there are no strong equities, it is not

In this case there is no strong equity.
THE COURT:

The Court will take a ten-minute recess.

The Court has read all the pleadings in support of and in
opposition to the motion.

We will take a ten-minute recess

and return and make a ruling.
(Court was in recess.)
THE COURT:
back in session.

The record will reflect the court is

Having read the memos in support of and in

opposition to the defendants1 motion for summary judgment

—

is that the only issue before the Court?
MR. PIPELLA:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
The Court looks carefully at a number of

facts and legal and equitable principles in this case, and
observes as follows:
conversion apply?
ruling?

Should the doctrine of equitable

If so, what facts are persuasive in so

The Court notes that when the Barkers gave a warranty

deed to Dianne Hodge, after the Clements1 judgment against the
Barkers had been docketed, that Dianne Hodge had construtive
notice of the existence of the judgment lien, and so did the

28

plaintiffs.

Prior to recording of the deeds from Barkers to

Hodge, and from Hodge to Cannefax, Security Title Agency did a
title search, and discovered the recorded judgment by
Clements.

As of that date, the Cannefaxes, through their

agent, not only had constructive notice but they had actual
notice that the judgment existed against the property.
The Court suggests that a reasonable course of
action would have been for the Cannefaxes to have insisted
that the judgment lien be cleared it the time they purchased
the property.

Then Security Title could have either excepted

that judgment lien from its coverage or made other
arrangements to remove the cloud on title.

Instead, they

ignored the judgment, they bound the title insurance on the
property, and they recorded the de^ds.
Now, the question is, if the Court is to be
persuaded to rule under equitable dloctrines, what is or what
isn't equitable?

Who was in the better position to anticipate

the ultimate implications of that cloud on title, and to deal
with it at the time of purchase of the property by the
plaintiffs in this case?

The Court feels and is persuaded by

the Butler vs. Wilkinson erase that States, in part, "A vendee
who voluntarily assigns or sells his equitable interest to a
third person does not by that assignment or sale extinguish a
creditor's judgment lien that attached during the vendee's
ownership of the equitable interest in the property, nor is a
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1

judgment lien against the vendor's interest extinguished by

2

the vendor's sale of that interest to a third person."

3

The Court rules that the contract vendor in fact

4

does retain an interest in real property, and so rules that

5

that was the case in the case before the Court.

6

facts stipulated, argument of counsel, the law cited, it is

7

the ruling of the Court that, according to the terms and

8

conditions and amounts heretofore stipulated by the defendant,

9

that summary judgment is granted to the defendant,

10

Based on the

Counsel, the Court appreciates a scholarly and

11

exhaustive approach to the briefing of these issues.

12

the type of case where, because of the complexity of the

13

issues, because of the implications of the ruling, the Court

14

appreciates the professional and thorough approach to this

15

matter by both counsel.

16

It is

The defendant is ordered to prepare a

written order consistent with the Court's ruling, submit it to
I

•

17

the Court for signature and filing with the Clerk of the Court

18

on or before the 5th day of March, 1988, 12 noon.

19

recess.

20 I

Court is in

(This proceeding was concluded.)

21
22
23
24
25

30
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I, BRAD J. YOUNG, hereby certify that on the 29th day of
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reporter, the proceedings in the aboverentitled and numbered
matter before the Honorable Pat B. Brian and that the
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Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 5th day of

April, 1988.
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STEVEN H. LYBBERT, Bar No. 4187
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Defendants
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake city/ Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND P.L. CANNEFAX and DEBRA ]
CANNEFAX,
Plaintiffs/
vs.
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH L.
CLEMENT,
Defendants.

}
)
]

ORDER AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

]1

Civil No. C87-6232

]

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment/ praying for
judgment in their favor and against plaintiffs on the Complaint
on file herein and for judgment in their favor and against
plaintiffs on the Counterclaim on file herein/ came on regularly
for hearing on February 29/ 1988 before The Honorable Pat B.
Brian/ District Judge.
Rodney M. Pipella.
H. Lybbert.

Plaintiffs appeared by their attorney,

Defendants appeared by their attorney/ Steven

The court has considered the $tipulated Facts,

defendants1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment/ plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Defendants1 Motion for Summary
Judgment/ and defendants1 Reply to Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment/ all of
which are on file herein/ and court has heard the oral arguments

of counsel.

Having considered the above pleadings and oral

argument/ and good cause appearing/
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants1 Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted; and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
judgment be, and hereby is; entered in favor of defendants and
against plaintiffs on the Complaint on file herein, and the
Complaint is hereby dismissed; and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

As a matter of law, a contract vendor of real

property does retain an interest in the real property which is
subject to the lien of a judgment against him,
2.

When defendants1 Judgment against George W. Barker,

Jr. and Lila Mr. Barker was docketed with the Clerk of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County on August 19, 1985,
that Judgment created a valid lien against the property at 2563
East Lockhart Road in Salt Lake County, Utah, which property is
more particularly described in paragraph 5 of the Verified
Complaint herein.
3.

In this case, in light of Stipulated Fact No. 14,

it is equitable that the judgment lien created when said Judgment
was docketed in Salt Lake County bound the property to the extent
of the amount unpaid on the Uniform Real Estate Contract between
the Barkers, as sellers, and Diane Hodge, as buyer, on September
25, 1985, (the date Diane Hodge received a warranty deed from the
Barkers and gave a warranty deed to plaintiffs), less the amount
of the prior encumbrances on the property in favor of Prudential

Federal Savings & Loan Association and Continental Bank and Trust
Company°, to wit/ the judgment lien bound the Lockhart Road
property in the sum of $54/464.94,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the temporary injunction in
effect in this case should be
Dated this

|

f

and hereby is# dissolved.

day of March/ 1988.
BY THE COURT:

Tjhe /Hon. Pat B. Brian
D i s t r i c t Judge
Approved as to form:

M
Rodhey M. Pipella
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOoo
Raymond P. L. Cannefax and Debra
Cannefax.

OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 890292-CA
Donald W. Clement and Ruth L.
Clement,
Defendants and Respondents.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Pat B. Brian
Attorneys:

FILED
FEB/ 21990
^tl^ck
of m« Court
UWh C*urt * Appeals

Rodney M. Pipella, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Steven H. Lybbert/ Salt Lake City, for Respondents

Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Bullock.1
BILLINGS, Judge:
Raymond and Debra Cannefax ("Cannefaxes") appeal a summary
judgment entered against them in their quiet title action and in
favor of Donald and Ruth Clement ("Clements"). In granting
summary judgment, the court held that a seller's retained legal
title to real property under an executory land sale contract was
-real property- and, therefore, that a judgment docketed by the
Clements, the seller's creditors, was a lien against the property
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (1987). We reverse.
George W. Barker, Jr. and Lila M. Barker ("Barkers") were fee
simple owners of the Lockhart Road Property at issue in this quiet
title action. In 1981, the Barkers entered into a uniform real
estate contract to sell their property to.Diane Hodge ("Ms.
Hodge") for $160,000. Ms. Hodge paid $40,000 to the Barkers at
the time of the sale and she was to pay the balance over the
contract term. On August 31, 1981, Ms. Hodge recorded a notice of
her uniform real estate contract.
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (1989).

Four years later, the Clements obtained a judgment against
the Barkers for $70,526 which was docketed in August 1985. The
stipulated facts show no attempt by the Clements to execute
against the Barkers' retained interest in the Lockhart Road
Property nor any attempt to garnish the proceeds Ms. Hodge paid
to the Barkers during the executory period of the uniform real
estate contract.
On September 25, 1985, Ms. Hodge paid the remaining amount
due under her uniform real estate contract with the Barkers,
satisfied prior obligations on the Lockhart Road Property, and
the Barkers deeded the property to her. At the same meeting, Ms.
Hodge sold the property to the Cannefaxes and gave them a
warranty deed to the Lockhart Road Property. After the dual
closings were completed, Surety Title conducted a title search
which disclosed the Clements' judgment docketed against the
Barkers. This is the first mention in the stipulated facts of
any actual knowledge of the Clements' judgment.
Subsequently, the Clements obtained a writ of execution
against the Lockhart Road Property then owned in fee simple by
the Cannefaxes. In response, the Cannefaxes brought this quiet
title acticm.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Clements, holding their judgment was a lien on the Lockhart Road
Property to the extent of $54,464.94, the amount which remained
unpaid on the uniform real estate contract between their judgment
debtors, the Barkers, and Ms. Hodge on September 25, 1985, the
date the Barkers deeded Ms. Hodge the property.
We find the trial court's ruling contrary to the doctrine of
equitable conversion which is the law in Utah. Under the
doctrine of equitable conversion, once parties have entered into
a binding and enforceable land sale contract, the buyer's
interest in the contract is said to be real property and the
seller's retained interest is characterized as personal
property. R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck, & D. Whitman, The Law of
Property § 10.13, at 698 (1984). The rights of the parties are
evaluated as if the conveyance had been made. H. McClintock,
McClintock on Equity § 106, at 284 (1948) [hereinafter
"McClintock on Equity"].
The Utah Supreme Court first adopted
equitable conversion in Allred v. Allred,
P.2d 791 (1964). The court characterized
under a land sale contract as personalty,

the doctrine of
15 Utah 2d 396, 393
the seller's interest
stating, "[a]s a

general rule an enforceable executory contract of sale has the
effect of converting the interest of the vendor of real property
to personalty.- 393 P.2d at 792. Again in In re Estate of
Willson, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298 (1972), the court clearly
held that the interest of a seller under a land sale contract was
personal property, not real property, for inheritance tax
purposes. 499 P.2d at 1300-01.
The court applied the doctrine of equitable conversion in a
condemnation context in Jelco v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 29
Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973). In Jelco, both the buyer and
the seller under an executory land sale contract claimed a right
to the increase in value of the land which had been condemned.
The court held the buyer was the owner of the land, and thus he
was entitled to the .condemnation proceeds. 511 P.2d at 741. In^
describing the status of the vendor under the contract the court
stated, "the vendor . . . has only legal title. In regard to the
purchase price, what he is entitled to is to have it paid in
accordance with the terms of the contract." XcL. See also Bill
Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neelev Consfcr. C|D . , 677 P.2d 1120, 1121
(Utah 1984) ("The interest of a purchaser under a real estate
contract is an interest in real property. . . . " ) .
Contrary to the claims made by the dissent, the Utah Supreme
Court has consistently applied the doctrine of equitable
conversion characterizing the seller's interest under an
executory land sale contract as personal property and the buyer's
interest as real property.2
The Utah Supreme Court recently applied the doctrine of
equitable conversion in determining the rights of judgment
creditors under an executory land sale contract in Butler v.
Wilkinson/ 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). In Butler, the court
squarely held that the buyer's interest under the executory land
sale contract was an interest in real property to which judgment
liens could attach. Justice Stewart stated: "The doctrine of
2. The dissent ignores the previous precedent, and rather
relies upon its interpretation of Reynolds v. Van Wagoner, 592
P.2d 593 (Utah 1979), claiming the Utah court chose not to apply
the doctrine of equitable conversion in this case because "it
would have led to an inequitable result inconsistent with the
contractual intent of the parties." We disagree with the
dissent's reading of this case. The Utah Supreme Court in
Reynolds did not utilize the doctrine of equitable conversion
because the case focused on abandonment df contractual rights
not equitable conversion. X£. at 594.

equitable conversion characterizes the seller's interest as an
interest in personalty and not as one in realty, whereas the
vendee's interest under the executory contract is deemed an
interest in realty," X&. at 1255. Further clarifying the
doctrine of equitable conversion as it affects judgment
creditors, he continued:
Under the doctrine of equitable
conversion, a vendee under a uniform real
estate contract obtains an equitable
interest in the land itself, even though
the vendor retains the legal title. The
vendee is said to convert the monetary
interest that he has in the property to an
interest in real estate so that he may
invoke the powers of an equity court to
compel specific performance of the real
estate contract, By a parity of
reasoning, the vendor under such a
contract is deemed to have converted his

interest in the land that is the subject
of the contract to a monetary ox legal
interest

. . . .

Id. at n.5 (emphasis added). The court further detailed the
nature of the interest retained by the seller under a land sale
contract, stating:
Under an installment land sale
contract, the vendor retains legal title
as security for the purchase price of the
property* Oaks v. Kendall, 23 Cal. App.
2d 715, 73 P.2d 1255 (1937); Marks v. City
Of Tucumcarj, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199
(1979). Nevertheless, as a general
proposition, the vendee is treated as the
owner of the land . . . .

The vendor's interest is similar to
the security interest of a purchase money
mortgagee.
Xd. at 1254-55 (emphasis added)

The supreme court in Butler concluded the buyer under a
binding executory land sale contract has an interest in real
property to which judgment liens may attach as to any other
real property interest but subject to the seller•s prior lien,
"By a parity of reasoning," the court concluded that the
seller's interest under the contract is merely the right to
receive the proceeds under the contract secured by his retained
legal title similar to the "security interest of a purchase
money mortgage," XdL- at 1255.
In Butler, Justice Stewart relied upon Marks v. Citv of
Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199 (1979)- In Marks, the New
Mexico court applied the doctrine of equitable conversion and
held that the interest retained by the vendor under a land sale
contract is personalty and not real estate, and thus that a
judgment docketed by a creditor of the seller during the
executory period of the contract had no effect on the interest
of a subsequent purchaser of the property, 595 P.2d 1201-02.
The dissent claims Butler supports its holding that a
judgment lien docketed against the seller's interest under a
uniform real estate contract survives as ^L lien against the
land even though all proceeds have previously been paid to the
judgment debtor-seller under the contract and the property has
been deeded to a subsequent purchaser for value. We disagree.
The dissent relies on the following language from Butler:
"[the seller has] a contract right to . . . take back the
vendee's interests if the vendee defaults. The vendor also has
an interest . . . measured by the amount the vendee owes under
the contract." Butler, 740 P.2d at 1255 (citation omitted).
This language is consistent with our view of the nature of-the
seller's retained interest, not the dissent's. The seller has
retained legal title as security to insure that he or she
receives the payments due under the contract; if the buyer
should default, the seller's title will not be released to the
buyer. This is the extent of the seller's retained
interest—which, under the doctrine of equitable conversion, is
not in the nature of real property such that liens can attach
under section 78-22-1.
This court's recent decision in Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746
P.2d 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), adopts our reading of fiuilsi.
In dicta, this court concluded that a judgment lien docketed
against a seller's interest under a uniform real estate
contract did not affect the rights of the buyer under that
contract. J&. at 805. Our language that "no judgment lien can
be created by a judgment docketed against a seller after the
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seller executes a binding earnest money contract," id.,
however, needs amplification. The docketed judgment does not
become a lien under the statute because the seller's retained
legal title is not real property.
We believe Utah authority supports the following analysis
of this case. The Barkers entered into a uniform real estate
contract to sell the Lockhart Road Property to Ms. Hodge before
the Clements docketed their judgment. Under the doctrine of
equitable conversion, the Barkers retained only bare legal
title to the property as security to receive the payment of the
proceeds due from Ms. Hodge under the contract. Thus, the
Clements' docketed judgment did not create a judgment lien
against the Lockhart Road Property.
The three jurisdictions relied upon by the dissent,
Nebraska, Idaho and Oregon, have held that a judgment creditor
of a contract seller will be given a lien in the property to
the extent of the unpaid amounts due under the contract.
Monroe v. Lincoln Citv Employees Credit Union, 203 Neb. 702,
279 N.W.2d 866, 868 (1979); First Sec. Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho
654, 429 P.2d 386, 389 (1967); Heider v. Dietz, 234 Or. 105,
380 P.2d 619, 624 (1963) (en banc). This rule has been
qualified, however, to allow a purchaser to continue to make
payments pursuant to his contract until he is given actual
notice of the judgment lien. The buyer is not required to
search the records before he makes his payments under the
contract. Lacy, Creditors of Land Contract Vendors, 24 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 645, 647 (1973) [hereinafter -Lacy, 24 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 645"].; Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of
Equitable Conversion bv Contract, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 578 (1935)
[hereinafter "Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 559 H ]. Furthermore, any
lien acquired by the judgment creditor is "discharged by
payment of the balance of the purchase money due although less
than the amount of the judgment." 1x1.; see also 3 Am. Law Real
Property § 11.29, at 86 (A. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter "3
Am. Law Real Property-].
Thus, not even the "rule" relied upon by the dissent
supports its position. There are no facts in the record to
support a finding that Ms. Hodge had actual notice of the
Clements1 judgment before she paid all proceeds due the Barkers
as sellers under the contract.
Furthermore, the rule relied upon by the dissent is not the
majority rule, nor the rule in.Utah. The following
jurisdictions have held that a judgment lien against the

seller's interest is not an encumbrance on the buyer's property
interest under a land sale contract: Marks v. City of
Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1979); Mueller v.
Novelty Dye Works, 273 Wis. 501, 78 N.W.2d 881, 884 (1956);
Stecker v. Snyder, 118 Colo. 153, 193 P.2d 881, 884 (1948);
Snow Bros. Hardware Co. v. Ellis, 180 Ark. 238, 21 S.W.2d 162,
163 (1929); S32. also Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 579 nrx.132, 133
and cases cited therein.
More importantly, all of these vintage cases dealing with
creditor's rights under an executory land sale contract turned
on the peculiar facts presented and do not undertake a reasoned
discussion of the application of the doctrine of equitable
conversion in dealing with third party creditors. Of more
assistance are the commentators who have written on the topic.
These commentators criticize the- approach taken by the dissent
and approve the one advocated herein.
Discussing the conceptual framework created by the doctrine
of equitable conversion in the judgment creSitor context, one
author states:
The rights of creditors of the vendor or
purchaser to reach the interest of their
debtor in the land contracted to be sold
or purchased depend in large part on the
theory of equitable conversion.' Since on
that theory, the purchaser is regarded as
owner of the land and debtor for the
purchase money and the vendor as holding
legal title as security for payment by the
purchaser, it logically follows that
creditors of the purchaser should be able
to reach the land subject to the vendor's
lien thereon, while creditors of the
vendor should be able to reach the land
only to the extent of the vendor's
security intgrgst.
3 Am. Law Real Property § 11.29, at 83 (emphasis added).
also McClintock on Equity § 106, at 286.

See

Several commentators have explicitly endorsed the cases
that refuse to.allow a vendor's judgment creditors to acquire a
lien as against the purchaser under an executory land sale
contract even though the purchase price is unpaid and the
purchaser has actual knowledge of the judgment lien. 3 Am. Law
Real Property § 11.29, at 86; Simpson, 44 tale L.J. 559, 579;

890292-CA

7

Lacy, 24 Case W. Res. L. Rev, 645, 662, "This works no
injustice upon the creditors, who may proceed by garnishment to
reach the purchase money or by bill for equitable execution to
reach both purchase money and vendor's lien." 3 Am. Law Real
Property § 11.29, at 86. Another commentator states:
[I]t is difficult to see why the
purchaser's knowledge of a judgment
against . . . his vendor, should impose
upon him the necessity of paying otherwise
than in accordance with his contract.
Some courts have held, and, it would seem
with sound reason, that the vendor's
judgment creditors acquire no lien as
against the purchaser even though the
purchase price is unpaid and the purchaser
knows of the judgment. This works no
injustice on the creditor, who may proceed
by garnishment to reach the purchase money
or by bill for equitable execution to
reach both purchase money and the vendor's
lien.
Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 579 (footnotes omitted).
Still another scholar concludes that even if one considers
that the seller's judgment creditor's lien can attach, the
creditor should not have any right to receive payments upon
mere attachment of a judgment lien but only upon an execution
sale. Lacy, 24 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 645, 662.
The dissent also alludes to several policy considerations
which it claims support its holding. We discuss each in turn.
The dissent rejects application of the doctrine of equitable
conversion under a uniform real estate contract claiming that
it "is hardly what most parties to a real estate sale contract
have in mind. The more straightforward notion of such a
contract envisions the land as changing hands only after the
price is paid." However, executory land sale contracts are
used by and are generally intended by the parties as long term
financing devices similar to mortagages or trust deeds.
Therefore, it is not inconsistent that the effect of a judgment
docketed against the seller under a uniform real estate
contract should be the same as one docketed against a
mortagagee or trust deed beneficiary. 'Furthermore, there are
absolutely no facts to support.the dissent's view of the
parties' intentions in this case. The dissent candidly admits

that the Barkers did not intend that their judgment creditors
could acquire a superior position to their buyer, Ms. Hodge,
under the uniform real estate contract.
The dissent further admits that -[e]nabling creditors to
have access to the seller's title to the property may lessen
somewhat the predictability of real estate transactions."
However, it answers this concern by chiding Professor Langdell
and his disciples for espousing certainty and predictability in
legal doctrines. We believe there is no better place for
Professor Langdell's "legal geometry" and predictability than
in the transfer of real property and its effect on innocent
third parties who must rely on some bright-line rule.
The dissent concludes the problems created for contract
buyers by its rule are not substantial as "a prudent buyer can
still assure his title by checking the judgment docket to
determine if creditors' claims exist." We believe the dissent
places an unreasonable burden on the buyer, one that for
practical purposes will destroy the commercial feasibility of
property sales by long-term contracts. Ui^der the dissent's
view, a buyer would be required to check the judgment docket
before making each monthly payment to the seller. We believe
the burden is more equitably placed on the judgment creditor
who can enforce his judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 64C, 64D or
69.
Finally, we do not see how the "equities," as claimed by
the dissent, are with the Clements as judgment creditors in
this case. The issue is not whether the Clements should have
recourse on their judgment but rather the procedural form of
their remedy and the person who can be compelled to satisfy
their judgment. It was the Clements who sat on their rights
failing to pursue their remedies. It is not inequitable that
as a result they cannot collect their judgment against a
subsequent innocent purchaser.3
3. There are no allegations that the Cannefaxes as buyers acted
in bad faith in purchasing the property at issue. For cases
where "sweetheart- contractual deals are entered into to defraud
creditors, there is a remedy available under the Utah Fraudulent
Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-1 to -13 (1989).

In conclusion, we reverse the summary judgment granted to
the Clements and order the trial court to enter summary
judgment in favor of the Cannefaxes quieting title to the
Lockhart Road Property in them.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

JACKSON, Judge (concurring):
The doctrine of equitable conversion runs counter to some
real property law concepts and my law practice observations of
the expectations of parties to real estate deals. If I had
been involved in the decisions to take the route leading to
adoption of the doctrine, I would not have favored the trip.
At this point, there is no junction, and the principle of stare
decisis requires that we continue the journey until our supreme
court chooses to change course. In the meantime, we need to
maintain a stable direction in the law for the benefit of those
involved in real estate transactions.

^4^2^'
Norman H. Jackson, Judge

BULLOCK, Judge (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. As a general proposition, I do not
have great difficulty in applying the doctrine of equitable
conversion to the buyer's interest under a installment land
sale contract. I do, however, have insurmountable difficulty
in applying it to the seller's interest to the extent that the
purchase price is unpaid, which is the result under the
majority opinion. I would, therefore, hold precisely opposite
to my esteemed colleagues and affirm the district court.
This case was heard in the district court on stipulated
facts and dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. From the
limited scope of those proceedings, the single issue before the
district court and on appeal is whether a contract seller's
retained title is real property to which judgment creditors'

liens can attach pursuant to section 78-22-1 to the extent ot
the unpaid price, or whether that title is personalty by reason
of the doctrine of equitable conversion, jto which judgment
creditors' liens cannot attach- The majority's conclusion that
the seller's retained title is personalty appears to me to be
contrary to the case law generally, to rujfi counter to public
policy, to presume facts not in evidence, and is based upon
grounds never argued here or below. I respectfully opine that
the majority misinterprets the applicable case law in Utah and
most other jurisdictions and reaches a result that has nothing
to recommend it in terms of public policy, other than the
pursuit of purely theoretical symmetry, that is to say, that if
the buyer's interest might be regarded as personal property,
then it invariably must follow for reasons of symmetry that the
seller's interest is personal property, even though the seller
has not been fully paid and has not parted with title. I
explain first how the majority's opinion conflicts with the
relevant Utah cases, and then turn to considerations of public
policy.
Utah Case Law on Equitable Conversion
A Utah appellate court has never squarely held, until this
case," that a judgment against the seller and duly docketed as
section 78-1-22 provides does not create a lien against the
seller's legal title to land agreed to be .sold under an
executory installment contract because the seller's retained
title was not real property. There are cases in which the
Supreme Court has relied on the doctrine of equitable
conversion in very different contexts; for example, in holding
that the seller of property later condemned was entitled only
to the contract amount-*- or in holding that 2 the seller's
interest was taxable as personal property, However> the
interests at stake in estate taxation and eminent domain are
very different from those at stake in debtor-creditor
relations, and the majority's references to dicta restating the
notion of equitable conversion in such cases provide no
compelling reason for applying equitable conversion to preclude
a judgment lien. The purely obiter recitations of the general
1. Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial District Court. 29 Utah 2d
472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973).
2. Willson v. State Tax Commission. 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d
1298 (1972).
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concept of equitable conversion are no authority for applying
it here. Mere definition of a concept does not justify its
application; we could as well define a judgment lien and
thereupon insist on vindicating the lien in this case.
The most thorough elucidation to date by the Utah Supreme
Court of the scope and limits of equitable conversion is found
in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). A footnote
in Butler at page 25, quoted in the majority opinion, defines
the concept of equitable conversion, and it is upon that
definition that the majority principally relies. However,
Butler stops far short of requiring equitable conversion in
every conceivable instance, and, in my analysis of it,
concludes contrary to the majority opinion in this case.3
Butler clearly holds that the buyer's interest is real property
to which a judgment lien attaches subject to the seller's
retained legal title,4 but it is not all-encompassing in
forcing universal adoption and application of the "parity of
reasoning" for which the majority contends. The main point of
the majority opinion seems to be that, because the buyer's
interest is real property, the seller's interest must
"logically" be personal property. However, Butler's
description of the "parity of reasoning," the logical symmetry
that underlies equitable conversion, is not an unqualified,
universal endorsement of it.
Butler's general, introductory restatement of the concept
of equitable conversion is, according to Butler itself, not a
universal verity that must be applied slavishly in every
conceivable instance, without regard to the merits of such an
application. Butler recognizes that equitable conversion
results in a characterization of the buyer that "is not wholly
3. Butler accordingly squares with the law of most
jurisdictions that have considered the question. See, e.g.,
First Security Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d 386 (1967)
("The majority rule is that a judgment lien against a vendor
after the making of the contract of sale extends to all of the
vendor's interest remaining in the land and binds the land to
the extent of the unpaid purchase price.); Heider v. Deitz. 234
P.2d 105, 429 P.2d 386 (1967). This majority rule is further
discussed later in this opinion.
4.

740 P.2d at 1255-56.

accurate,'0 and further notes that equitable conversion does
not prevent a judgment docketed against the seller from
becoming a lien on the seller's title to the land.^
After stating that judgment creditors' liens against a
buyer's equitable contractual interest are not extinguished by
an "assignment, sale, or rescission," the Butler opinion
continues: "Nor for that matter, is a judgment lien against
the vendor's interest extinguished by the vendor's sale of that
interest to a third person,"7 The Clements argue, and I
agree, that this statement clearly shows that the Supreme Court
considers the seller's retained title to be real property,
since judgment liens attach only to real property, not to
personal property, pursuant to section 78^-22-1.
The majority views the seller's interest as, at most, a
lien. In this regard, it is true that Butler analogizes the
seller's interest to a purchase money mortgage, but Butler is
careful to point out it is really no mere lien; rather, it is
legal title to the land, albeit subject to a conditional
promise to convey at a future date.° Legal title to land is
not only within the definition and plain meaning of "real
property" in section 78-22-1, but also it is the very archetype
of what real property is. 9
Butler clearly recognizes that the seller retains legal
title, and that is where the analytical usefulness of the
analogy to a lien ends. The seller's retained legal title is
5. 740 P.2d at 1255. Butler further notes that equitable
conversion operates to treat the buyer as owner of the land only
"as a general proposition." I recognize that in many
situations, it makes good sense to regard the prospective,
conditional performance of the contract as if it were an
accomplished fact; however, this case does not present such a
situation.
6. "[A] judgment lien against the vendor's interest [is not]
extinguished by the vendor's sale of that interest to a third
person." 740 P.2d at 1258.
7.

Butler. 740 P.2d at 1258 (emphasis addpd).

8.

£££ 740 P.2d at 1256 n. 6.

9.

See Restatement of Property § 10 comment c (1936).
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indeed similar to a lien or mortgage, in that it permits the
seller to regain the land if the buyer defaults. However, the
fact that the retained title may function like a lien in
certain circumstances is far from saying that it is identical
or equivalent to a lien for all purposes. 10 We do not have a
case here in which a seller recovers property from a delinquent
buyer, and therefore, the lien analogy has little utility in
this particular situation. Rather, this is a case in which a
third party seeks to realize a judgment out of the seller's
asset, and the legal nature of that asset is the object of our
inquiry. In this context, it is quite immaterial that the
buyer could lose his interest in a forfeiture that in some ways
operates as a lien foreclosure. What is important for present
purposes is that the Barkers held legal title, and, although
they had agreed to part with it at a later date if Hodge
performed her obligations, they still held legal title when the
Clements docketed their judgment. Consistent with Butler, a
judgment lien would therefore attach to that title to the
extent of the unpaid balance,of the contract price.
In respectful contrast to Judge Jackson's concurring
opinion, I am convinced that stare decisis does not compel the
result reached by the majority. Dicta in Lach v. Deseret
Bank 11 may have expressed a view on the subject, but dicta
are not holding, and only a holding of the court need be
followed under the principle of stare decisis. 12 The precise
question that is squarely presented in this case was an open
question in Utah case law until this case. The prior adoption
in our case law of the general notion of equitable conversion
does not mean that it must apply in this case; whenever a
doctrine of such broad scope is embraced, it must be fine-tuned
10. Justice Stewart clearly recognized the limitations of the
lien analogy in the Butler opinion when he wrote: "The term
•vendor's lien' seems to have stuck even though it is
inaccurately used before the vendor parts with the title. Until
then, it is not, in fact, a lien at all, but rather a retained
interest in the land that is derived from the vendor's retention
of the fee title." 740 P.2d at 1256 n.6.
11.

746 P.2d 802 (Utah 1988).

12. Soring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 103,
277 P. 206, 210 (1929); Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533,
216 P. 234, 236-37 (1923).

and exceptions must be carved out to prevent injustice in the
many varied applications of the doctrine. Some of the
limitations on equitable conversion were explained in the
Butler case, and in the case before us now, Butler clearly
indicates that equitable conversion should not be applied here.
Deficiencies in Rationale
This is the first time a Utah appellate court has squarely
held that a docketed judgment does not create a lien against
the seller's retained title to real property under a contract
of sale. Since we here lay down a precedent, I think it is
important to examine the rationale and public-policy impacts of
that holding.
The doctrine of equitable conversion is the notion that the
seller of a specifically 3 enforceable contract to convey land is
deemed to own primarily^- an interest in personal property,
and the buyer's14 interest under the contract is characterized as
real property.
However, while that notion leads to a
sensible result in some situations, it is important not to lose
13. The "bare legal title" retained by the seller is sometimes
said to be held in trust for the buyer, see* e.g., In re
Hiohberaer's Estate, 360 A.2d 580 (Pa. 1076); In re Krotzsch's
Estate, 60 111. 2d 342, 326 N.E.2d 758 (1975); Smith v. Tang,
100 Ariz. 196, 412 P.2d 697 (1966), or to be a constructive lien
to secure payment of the price, see Oaks v. Kendall. 23 Cal.
App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d 1255, 1258-59 (1937). The term "lien,"
however, is actually something of a misnomer, as the Utah
Supreme Court explained in Butler, 740 P.2d at 1256 n.6:
The term "vendor's lien" . . . is
inaccurately used before the vendor parts
with the title. Until then, it is not, in
fact, a lien at all, but rather a retained
interest in the land that is derived from
the vendor's retention of the fee title.
14. See generally 3 American Law of Property 62-64 (Casner,
ed., 1952); R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman, The Law of
Property 698-701 (1984); H. McClintock, McClintock on Eouitv
284-88 (1948); 4 J. Pomeroy & S. Symons, A Treatise on Eouitv
Jurisprudence 472-80 (1941); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on Eouitv
Jurisprudence 485-92 (1918).

sight of the fact that such a characterization of the parties'
interests is not generally what they have in mind. The more
straightforward notion of such a contract envisions the land as
changing hands only after the price is paid; until then, the
seller still owns the land and the buyer is in the unfulfilled
process of acquiring it. 15 In order to understand why a
legal doctrine such as equitable conversion could be
acknowledged at all, when its effect is to transform realty
into personalty, automatically and in disregard of the
intention of the parties, a brief excursus into our legal
history may be helpful.
The English common law developed along the lines of certain
specific "writs" issued by the king's courts to address certain
specific wrongs. Pursuant to an early statute, problems that
did not fit within the scope of an existing writ could not be
remedied by the king's courts, although the courts in time
became somewhat adept at stretching the scope of the prescribed
writs by analogy.16 Still, many grievances, such as a simple
breach of a contract, for example, were for centuries not
effectively resolved by the rigid, stultified rules of the
common law.1*7
When relief was not available at common law for a perceived
wrong, the aggrieved person at first petitioned the king .
directly to intervene and do justice. The kings came to refer
such petitions to their chancellors to be decided according to
conscience and equity, rather than by the rigid rules of the
common law. The chancellors eventually developed a system of
courts, procedure, and substantive law separate from the common
law, which came to be known by the word "equity."
One of the remedies commonly employed by the courts of
equity was specific performance, an order directing the
defendant to perform a specific act in furtherance of a
contractual obligation. In a contract for the sale of land, a
recalcitrant seller could be ordered in equity to specifically
15.

3A A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 193-94 (1960).

16.

D. Dobbs, Remedies 28-35 (1978).

17. Id.; L. Fuller & M. Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law 63-66
(1972).

perform the contract, that is, to actually convey the land.
he failed to do so, he could be penalized for contempt. 18

If

One of the time-honored maxims of equity was that it
"regards as done that which ought to be done." Applying this
maxim to land sale contracts came to mean that if specific
performance could be granted on the contract, the contract
could be considered as if it had been fully performed. The
seller could therefore be treated as having conveyed the
property and received the price, and the buyer as having
received the property. The seller was therefore deemed in
equity to hold personal property, and the buyer, real
property. This deeming was, of course, a legal fiction; the
contract was fully performed only in the chancellor's
imagination. The reality was that a deed would be delivered
and the seller would consider himself no longer the owner when
the sale had been consummated by receipt of the full price. 19
When the English legal tradition was transplanted to
America, the doctrine of equitable conversion came along with
it. In 1905, the American legal scholar Christopher Columbus
Langdell systematized it elaborately, and it almost seems as if
Langdell placed his philosophical mark upon the doctrine,
making it into a "legal geometry" or a "heaven of juristic
conceptions."20 For Langdell, law was a science, whose data
in the English tradition were the prior decisions of
courts. 21 To the legal scientist, cloistered in the library
18. The earliest origins of equitable conversion have been
traced to trust concepts, independent of specific performance.
Davis, The Origin of the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion bv
Contract 25 Ky. L.J. 58 (1936); Simpson, Legislative Changes in
the Law of Eouitable Conversion by Contract, 44 Yale L.J. 559
n.3 (1935). The current formulation of the doctrine, however,
is firmly linked to the specific enforceability of the contract,
perhaps due to the oft-cited formulation by Lord Eldon in a case
seeking specific performance, Seton v. Slafle, 7 Ves. Jun. 265
(1802).
19. The fictional character of the rule is apparent in the fact
that equity would not invoke it to give the purchaser any real
incidents of ownership before the time set for performance. H.
McClintock, McClintOCk on Equity 295 (1948).

20.

3 American Law of Property 64 (Casner, ed., 1952).

21. Address by C.C. Langdell delivered November 5, 1886,
reprinted in Law Quarterly Review 123, 124 (1887).
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that was his laboratory, it was irrelevant
extracted from the cases produced a result
unjust or at odds with common sense. What
whether the rule was a good one but rather
rule. 22

whether the rule
that was in reality
mattered was not
whether -it was the

This rather mechanistic, wholly abstract view of the law
has fallen upon evil days in recent decades. Sociological
jurisprudence and legal realism waged a war of commentary on
the application of fixed rules without regard to fairness in an
individual case or to social policy. In particular, equitable
conversion came to be explained as a "name given to results
reached on other grounds." 23 No longer was it a set of.
substantive rules describable in clauses beginning with "if"
and "then"; rather, it was simply a shorthand method of
describing what came after the "then." There was still little
thought of adding an express "because .' . . ," or of explaining
the reasons for either the substantive rule or the result in a
specific case.
This inattention to the reasons for equitable conversion
led to some roundhouse critiques of the doctrine. Harlan Stone
debunked it in a 1913 article. 24
Several other writers also
denounced, and uniform legislation was proposed to counteract,
its effect of placing the risk of casualty loss on the buyer
during the executory period. 25 Some cases hedged in relying
on the equitable conversion doctrine, declaring that it would
22. For example, Langdell noted in his casebook on contracts
that the "mailbox rule" holding that acceptance is effective on
dispatch, regardless of whether it is received, had been criticized as leading to unjust and absurd results. "The true
answer" to that criticism was, according to Langdell, "that it
is irrelevant." C.C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law
of Contracts 995-96 (2d ed. 1879).
23. Pound, The Progress of the Law, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 832
(1920); see also Stone, Equitable Conversion bv Contract, 13
Colum. L. Rev. 369 (1913).

24. stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract/ 13 Colum. L . Rev.
369 (1913).
25. E.g., Vannemann, Risk of Loss in Equity between the Date of
Contract to Sell Real Estate and Transfer of Title, 8 Minn. L.
Rev. (1924); Williston, The Risk of Loss After an Executory

Contract of Sale in the Common Law, 9 Harv. L . Rev. 106 (1895).

be invoked only when it led to a fair result,26 Contrary to
the majority's claim, my thorough reading of the modern
commentary on equitable conversion generally reveals little
enthusiasm for universal application of the doctrine and no
persuasive reasoning to support its application in this case.
The scholarly criticism of the blind application of the
doctrine of equitable conversion has, however, been only
partially successful in preventing its misuse in the courts.
Leading commentators have recently noted that "decisions [on
equitable conversion] often seem adamant in their unwillingness
to discuss the underlying policy issues; equitable conversion
almost becomes a substitute for thinking about the real
questions in the c a s e / 2 7 There is no justification for
ignoring what is actually happening in a case and what the
parties' clash of interests is really all about. Invoking a
talisman such as "equitable conversion" tb give a name and
ostensible legitimacy to a rule without a rationale is a
jurisprudential cop-out, and exposes society to potential
danger from rules that have drifted from their public policy
moorings. In my opinion, courts have a responsibility to
continually scrutinize the law we apply, particularly
judicially-created law such as equitable conversion, in order
to weed out defects in the law as it has been handed down to us
and to keep it consistent with evolving social policy and
conditions. 28
26. E.g., Clay v. Landreth, 187 Va. 169, 187 S.E.2d 875 (1948);
In re Seifert's Estate, 109 N.H. 62, 242 A.2d 64, 33 A.L.R.3d
1276 (1967); National Bank of Topeka v. Saia. 154 Kan. 739, 121
P.2d 251 (1942)
'.
27. R. Cunningham, W, Stoebuck & D. Whitman, The Law of
Property 699 (1984).
28. See Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281,
1285-86 (Utah 1987); B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial
process 98-142 (1921). Holmes expressed both the compunctions
and the necessity felt by a person who must discharge this
responsibility in saying that he "hesitate|[s] to affirm
universal validity for his social ideals" and "may be ready to
admit that he knows nothing about an absolute best in the
cosmos, and even that he knows next to nothing about a permanent
best for men. Still it is true that a body of law is more
rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is
referred articulately and definitely to an end which it
subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated
or are ready to be stated in words." Holmes, The Path of the
LaH, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 468-69 (1897).
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Viewing the policies and practical reasons for equitable
conversion, I firmly believe that it is not a rule that should
be applied as a matter of course in every instance- Rather, it
describes a result in which the seller's interest is deemed to
be essentially personalty and the buyer's interest to be
realty. In reaching that result, the court should endeavor, as
with any contract, to give effect to the reasonable
expectations of the parties, 29 While applying equitable
conversion automatically for every question involving a land
sale contract may foster easy predictability, it would
nevertheless in many instances disregard or frustrate what the
parties intended their contract to accomplish, which is a
transfer of property when it is paid for, but not before. The
contract in this case, for example, clearly contemplates a
transfer of ownership by deed after all installments have been
paid.
One involuntary consequence30 of the seller's retention
of title to the property is that his creditors may reach it in
satisfaction of their claims against him. Enabling creditors
to have access to the seller's title to the property is thought
by the majority to lessen the predictability of real estate
transactions. However, a prudent buyer can still assure his
title by checking the judgment docket to determine if
creditors' claims exist. In this and most sales, the buyer has
recourse against the seller if title is encumbered, and, if the
encumbrance is serious, may rescind the sale..31 If, however,
29. 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 1-3 (1963); see 9lSQ John
Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207
(Utah 1987); Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of Am., 17 Utah 2d 114,
405 P.2d 339 (1965); Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332
P.2d 989 (1958).
30. We recognize that the buyer and seller in this case, like
most, probably did not intend for a judgment lien to attach to
the seller's interest shortly before the seller conveyed to the
buyer, and they would have precluded the lien, if that were
possible. However, the law also recognizes the rights of a
party's creditors to reach assets in satisfaction of their
judgments, without regard to the debtor's preferences in the
matter. Therefore, once it is clear that they have, by their
intent, retained a property interest, the rights of creditors to
reach that interest operate without regard to what the
debtor-promisor and his promisee may have intended..
31. Barastrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984); Callister v.
Millstream Assocs.. Inc., 738 P.2d 662 (Utah App. 1987).

the buyer ignores the encumbrance, he proceeds at his peril,
unless he can prove himself to be a bona fide purchaser or
invoke statutory protection such as the recording act. 32
Neither Hodge nor the Cannefaxes attempted to rescind, or
asserted that they are bona fide purchasers or protected under
the recording act. In these circumstances, there is nothing
wrong with leaving the loss to fall upon the buyer, who is able
to discover in advance the faults in the title and take
corrective action.
In determining the legal effect of a contract, therefore,
the intent of the parties 33 should carry far more weight than
a legal fiction, however deep in tradition the fiction's
roots. People have a right to make contracts and to have their
lawful contractual intentions fulfilled, and they cannot fairly
be expected to make contracts with a thorough knowledge of the
oblique way in which 'nine centuries of equitable jurisprudence
may twist and "convert" the meaning of their intentions.34
In holding that the buyer's and seller's interests are
equitably converted, the majority is oblivious to the face of
the contract itself, which provides that the seller will convey
the real property when the price is received, and not before.
It was undisputed that the price was not received when the
Clements' judgment was docketed.
In my view, the majority also places Insufficient value in
the need to efficiently enforce judgments. They intimate that
the Clements could have executed on their judgment, but ignore
the fact that their execution was judicially restrained in this
case. It is also unclear in Utah law that the Clements have
anything on which they could execute, without a judgment lien.
At common law, execution cannot be levied on a chose in
action,35 and, although that common law rule has been changed
by statute in many jurisdictions, there is no applicable Utah
32.

See Greoerson v. Jensen. 669 P.2d 396, 398-99 (Utah 1983).

33. Contrary to the majority's view, the intent of the parties
is clear from the face of their contract, and, under the parol
evidence rule, extrinsic evidence is unnecessary and
inadmissible.< Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v.
Blomquistr 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
34. Other equitable doctrines, such as estoppel, laches,
unclean hands, etc. are not subject to this same criticism.
Rather, they serve to carry into effect the fair and reasonable
intentions of the parties.
35.

33 C.J.S. Executions § 28 at 158-59 (1942).
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statute. Thus, by reducing the seller's interest to a mere
contract receivable, the majority leaves the judgment creditor
without a clear, sure means of reaching the seller's contract
interest under our law, other than by garnishing each payment
as it accrues. Enforcing a duly entered judgment thus becomes
a cumbersome process of having a writ issued and served before
each installment is paid.
Most jurisdictions that have considered this question have
weighed the policy considerations as I do. Contrary to the
assertion of the majority, the scholars studying this question
all conclude that the majority of jurisdictions hold that a
judgment lien attaches to the seller's interest in a contract
for the sale of real property.36
More persuasive, however, than the results of any
interstate judicial poll are the compelling needs to recognize
the parties' contractual intent and to provide an effective
means of enforcing judgments. Conversely, there is no real
reason favoring equitable conversion in this setting, other
than perhaps a wish for abstract symmetry or eleaantia juris,
which could incline one to the notion that, since the buyer has
real property under equitable conversion principles, the seller
must conversely have personal property for all purposes,
including the attachment of judgment liens.27 However, to
36. E,g,, Monroe v. Lincoln Citv Employees Credit Union, 203
Neb. 702, 279 N.W.2d 866 (1979); First Security Bank v. Rogers,
91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d 386 (1967); Heider v. Deitz, 234 P.2d
105, 429 P.2d 386 (1967). Surveys of case law on point include
R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman, The Law of Property 701
(1984); Lacy, Creditors of Land Contract Vendors, 24 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 645, 646 (1973); 3 Am. Law of Property 11.29 at 85
(1952).
37. It is perhaps ironic that equity, which began as an effort
to overcome the constricting formalism of the common law writ
system, came to have such a penchant for wholly abstract logical
symmetry. Some of this devotion to abstract symmetry has already
been discarded; the old equitable doctrine of mutuality of
remedy, for example, which held that an equitable remedy could
be granted to the plaintiff only if the defendant, under like,
hypothetical circumstances, could obtain the same remedy, has
been totally discarded. Utah Mercnr Gold Mining Co. v. Herschel
fiolrt Mining Co. , 103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1943) ("The
remedy of one should not depend upon the hypothetical case of
what another could demand if the situation were different.");
ftennla Town v. Sanfcaquin City- 96 Utah 88, 80 P.2d 930, 934
(1938).

give way to such a wish in disregard of the parties* intent and
of the need to enforce lawful judgments is sheer formalism, a
glorification of abstraction for abstraction's sake.
Potential Defenses Not Raised
The Cannefaxes' position here and in the district court
has consisted only of an attempt to invok^ equitable conversion
to prevent the Clements' judgment lien from attaching. The
Cannefaxes have not asserted any defenses against the
enforcement of the Clements' lien, once it attached.
Ordinarily, there would be little need to mention defenses
never raised by the parties, but in this case, I believe the
majority has, in effect, given some weight to those potential
defenses. They presume, for example, that the Cannefaxes are
bona fide purchasers, and they also view the Clements as having
failed to perform a duty to give actual notice to the
Cannefaxes, in order to "perfect," in a sense, their lien
against the Cannefaxes. However, the Cannefaxes' bona fides
and lack of actual notice are unproven facts that might have
been material to defensive arguments that were never raised.
Since the Cannefaxes had the burden of avoiding the lien in
order to quiet title,38 judgment against them is correct,
even though there was no apparent inquiry into either actual
notice, the Cannefaxes* knowledge of the judgment or lack of
it, or into their bona fides in any respedt.
As the majority also points out, several jurisdictions
have held that the judgment lienor cannot recover from the
buyer any installment payments made in the ordinary course of
contract performance without actual noticd of the existence of
the judgment lien.39 These holdings are rooted in concern
that the buyer not be required to check the judgment docket
every time an installment payment is made; such would be an
38. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d
145 (1973).
39. Mav v. Emerson, 52 Ore. 262, 96 P. 454 (1908); Wehn v.
Fall, 55 Neb. 547, 76 N.W. 13 (1898); &££ R. Cunningham, W.
Stoebuck & D. Whitman, The Law of Property 702 (1982); Lacy,
Creditors of Land Contract Vendors. 24 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at
646-47; A. Freeman & E. Tuttle, A Treatise on the Law of
Judgments 965 (5th ed. 1905).
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-intolerable inconvenience."40 Instead, the buyer is
permitted to continue paying installments, which are credited
against the price, until the buyer is given actual, not merely
constructive, notice of the lien. I have no quarrel with such
a conclusion, but there is absolutely no occasion to reach it
in this case, since there is no indication in the stipulated
facts whether or not the Cannefaxes had actual notice of the
lien at a time when they could have averted consummation of the
sale. The Cannefaxes, in seeking to quiet title against the
Clements, had the burden of going forward with evidence showing
that the lien was unenforceable.41 All section 78-22-1
requires for a lien to attach is entry of the judgment and
docketing in the proper county. The judgment creditor is not
required to do anything more, such as give actual notice to a
contract buyer, and to require more would run contrary to
section 78-22-1. 42
40. Moyer v. Hinman, 13 N.Y. 180 (1855). Such concern
certainly has its place in adjudication, and Utah case law has
recognized that simple fairness and "the equities" may properly
be considered in reaching a decision. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557
P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976); but see Briaas v. Liddell, 699 P.2d
770, 772 (Utah 1985) ("equitable powers are narrowly bounded").
However, an unstructured, unguided inquiry.into "whatever's
fair" invites subjectivity and inconsistent, uncertain results,
and the often elusive and ethereal nature of "fairness" would
leave little effective means, other than litigation, for
resolving disputes. I would therefore prefer to see such
equitable concern take a more structured form, such as laches.
Under that doctrine, a lienor would be barred from enforcing the
lien if the lienor delayed in asserting his rights while his
adversary performed reasonably and innocently to his detriment.
See Borland v. Chandler. 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987).
41. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co.. 511 P.2d at 146. There
are several other potential arguments which, in an appropriate
factual setting, the buyer could have asserted against the
lien. However, we have neither facts nor argument to enable us
to determine, for example, whether the title company handling
the closing was negligent and could have reversed the
transaction by returning escrowed deeds and money when it
learned of the lien, or whether the Clements1 lien is inferior
in priority to the interests of Hodge and the Cannefaxes.
42. Taylor Nat'l, Inc. v. Jensen Bros. Constr. Co., 641 P.2d
150, 154-55 (Utah 1982).

Conclusion
In conclusion, I believe there is no question but that the
buyer's interest in an executory land sale contract may be
characterized as real property under the fiction of equitable
conversion for the purpose of the attachment of the buyer's
judgment creditors' liens. However, the cases, including
Butler, do not hold that because the buver's interest may be
considered real property for that purpose, it must then
necessarily follow that the seller's retained title is
personalty to which the liens of the seller's judgment
creditors cannot attach.
In my opinion, the rule to be deduced from Butler and the
cases cited therein is that the seller's retained title in an
installment land sale contract was, is, and remains real
property to the extent of the unpaid balance of the purchase
price for the purposes of the attachment of liens of the
seller's judgment creditors. Further, by reason of the fiction
of equitable conversion, the buyer's interest may also be
characterized as real property, limited only by the right of
the seller to receive the purchase price and the performance of
other, terms of the contract.
I recognize that the recording statutes and bona fide
purchaser considerations are significant and may be overriding
in a given case.43 However, no such matters appear from the
stipulated facts in this case and none were raised or argued in
the district court or here on appeal.
From the cases, as well as an examination of the
historical underpinnings of the equitable conversion fiction,
which is not a doctrine of universal application, I am
regrettably compelled to respectfully disagree with the
mMOEity's opinion, and I. would affirm the trial court.

ifi. Robert Bullock, Judge

43.

Euilej:, 740 P.2d 1259-60.
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